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I. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
It is perpetually astounding that in the field of financial markets writers
can pass themselves off as experts merely by writing a lot, without regard to
reason.' Writers purport to prove the ridiculous by uttering the incantation
"equilibrium" which so thoroughly intimidates econophobes that they will
believe absurd propositions.2
Criticism of outcomes determined in financial markets is not useful
without proposing an alternative method for setting prices and allocating re-
sources. Should we replace irrational financial markets with political deci-
sions?
Hopefully, before getting this far into the paper, all readers are thinking,
"Who would ask such a silly, rhetorical question?" Yet we continue to wit-
ness in the literature an alarming advance of arguments that market partici-
pants are not rational and that their decisions create social problems.' For
example, Professor Jill Fisch recently wrote:
How should regulators determine if investors are not behaving
rationally and what, if anything, should they do about irrational in-
vestor behavior? Standard economic analysis assumes that inves-
tors respond rationally to information, causing the market to incor-
porate that information into market prices. A growing behavioral
1. Cf Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be Regulation of
Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 J. CoRP. L. 69, 72 (2002) [hereinafter Klock,
Fortune Tellers] ("Regulatory proposals for financial markets are often pushed by advocates who
lack knowledge of the empirical facts because they lack knowledge of economic theory and statistic-
al inference and may lack data as well.").
2. Cf Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? Use and Abuse of Eco-
nomic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 181, 183 (2002) [hereinafter Klock, Flamboyance] ("The notion
that law has suffered from the influence of too much economic analysis is . .. symptomatic of an
irrational phobia . . . ."); cf id at 186 ("[O]ne cannot persuasively dismiss economic arguments with
a wave of the hand and a ritual incantation that economics is based on flawed assumptions and there-
fore wrong.").
3. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 213 (1995) ("In fact, however, empirical evidence shows that actors characteristically
violate the standard rational-choice or expected-utility model, due to the limits of cognition.");
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (1998) (arguing that the predictions of economic theory are often
wrong); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ratio-
nality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055-56 (2000) ("There is
simply too much credible experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are in-
compatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory. It follows that the analysis of the incen-
tive effects of legal rules based on such implausible behavioral assumptions cannot possibly result in
efficacious legal policy, at least not in all circumstances." (footnote omitted)); Robert A. Prentice,
The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 133, 139 (2000) [hereinafter Prentice, Behavioral Insight] ("Although economic analysis has
brought much value to the legal realm, its basic premise regarding the rational man is so deeply
flawed that it has also brought much mischief.").
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economics literature questions this assumption-identifying biases,
errors, and irrationalities in investor behavior and arguing that irra-
tional investor behavior may lead the market to under- or over-react
to information. The literature makes a convincing case for at least
some level of investor irrationality. The problem, however, is iden-
tifying the appropriate response to investor irrationality. Should
regulators attempt to protect investors from bad investment deci-
sions that may be the result of irrational behavior?4
Obviously, anyone contemplating a non-market solution to the problems
associated with markets must have an alternative framework in mind.' The
only alternative system possible, however, is a political one, which is surely
less stable than even the least efficient market.6
In this Article, I review several longstanding debates and provide new
insights as to why proponents of "the new finance" and behavioral law and
economics have arrived at misleading results. The first debate concerns the
rationality of individuals.7 Many commentators have argued that the econ-
omist's assumption of the rational man is deeply flawed.8  The second de-
bate concerns whether financial markets price securities irrationally.9 These
debates are critically important in law.'o Much of the development of law
has been based upon development of economic theory."
4. Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the Research Ana-
lyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 57, 59 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
5. Cf Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1552 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Rational Choice] (criticizing critics of neoclassical
economics for not providing an alternative rigorous theoretical framework).
6. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice andLegislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 340 (1988) ("To
the extent that one can draw a positive principle from Arrow, it is that democracy should yield capri-
cious and unstable outcomes."); cf JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 291-92 (1962) (describing how political coalitions use government to the disadvantage of
society).
7. See infra Part IlI.
8. See sources cited supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 137, 138
(2006) [hereinafter Ribstein, Noisy Market] ("The field of behavioral finance has had a bull market,
particularly since the millennial bubble and its popping. The literature not only shows many ways in
which individuals make mistakes, but also indicates that markets as well as individuals may be irra-
tional.").
10. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 185 (explaining that misspecification of rationality
has important implications for legal analysis).
11. See Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 35, 39 (2005) ("Just as neoclassical economics has helped to explicate human beha-
vior to a significant degree, traditional law and economics scholarship has been able to aid the analy-
sis of an enormous number of the legal problems in a fairly parsimonious way. The success of this
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There is an endogenous relationship between the legal system and the
economic system. The development of law is fostered by a strong economy,
and a strong economy is fostered by a strong legal system.12 Those who ar-
gue that economic theory is a largely inaccurate model of the world are seek-
ing to change laws and policy that have developed based on economic in-
sight. 3 This leads into a third debate about the role of markets and the role
of government in the allocation of social resources.14  Two particular ele-
ments are new in my review of this debate. First, there is new and recent
commentary containing misleading examples that I will expose. 5 Second,
recent research in finance has proven that more basic economic principles,
such as budget constraints and market clearing, result in rational asset pric-
ing even with irrational investors. 6 Models claiming to show that financial
markets can systematically price assets incorrectly over indefinite periods in
school of thought is undeniable.").
12. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Mar-
kets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 782-83 (2001). An endogenous variable is one that originates from
within an economic model. For an explanation of the proper construction of an economic model, see
infra note 30 and accompanying text.
13. Peter Smith argues, "[T]here is an increasingly large body of empirical work that suggests, at
a minimum, that the assumption of the Court in Basic-that is, that investors are purely rational eco-
nomic actors and that securities markets function efficiently-might be a new legal fiction." Peter J.
Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1457 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Fictions] (referring
to Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). Smith defines new legal fictions as follows:
A court deploys a new legal fiction when (1) the court offers an ostensibly factual sup-
position as a ground for creating a legal rule or modifying, or refusing to modify, an ex-
isting legal rule; and (2) the factual supposition is descriptively inaccurate. In most cases,
the premise is false because empirical research has demonstrated that it is false, although
occasionally the factual supposition so conflicts with general knowledge and convention-
al wisdom that it can be characterized as a new legal fiction even without reference to
empirical research. To be a new legal fiction, the court must offer the factual supposition
as a (or the) basis supporting the court's normative choice among competing possible le-
gal rules.
Id at 1441.
14. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989) (suggesting that psy-
chology and sociology have more to contribute to legal analysis than unrealistic economic theory);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
445, 468-79 (1994) (arguing that economic measures of efficiency and social welfare improvements
lack moral legitimacy); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1438 (1967) (arguing that the usefulness of economics
is constrained by the supremacy of moral and legal reasoning); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis ofStock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 613, 708-09 (1988) [hereinafter Stout, Economic Analysis] (arguing that goals based on
economic theory must be abandoned to promote alternative social objectives).
15. E.g., Lynn A. Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, 14 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION
95, 97 (2005) [hereinafter Stout, New Finance] (stating that the assumption of perfect markets in the
presence of heterogeneous expectations renders equilibrium impossible and providing a pseudo-
economic model to illustrate the claim).
16. Mark Loewenstein & Gregory A. Willard, The Limits of Investor Behavior, 61 J. FIN. 231,
256 (2006).
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the presence of irrational investors contain an implicit assumption of unli-
mited free credit which is a distorting, absurd assumption rather than an ar-
tistic, simplifying assumption."
This Article is motivated by one commentator's "simple market" model
claiming to "prove" an absurd result.'8 The model is inherently not econom-
ic because it contains a rather ridiculous assumption that takes it out of the
realm of economics. 9 For a model to be part of the subject matter of eco-
nomics, the decision makers must make sacrnfices.20 That is, they must
choose between alternatives.I This is the sad reality that makes the subject
of economics too unpleasant for some of us to confront.22
Professor Lynn Stout has made a few previous mistakes explaining eco-
nomic theory and interpreting economic models. 23 In what I consider to be
17. Id.
18. Stout, New Finance, supra note 15, at 97-98 (proving that equilibrium is impossible in a per-
fect market with heterogeneous expectations).
19. Although she does not explicitly state so, Professor Stout's assumption of a perfect market is
what economists refer to as a Walrasian market. See Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Do-
minant and Satellite Markets: A Study of Dually-Traded Securities, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 455,
456 (1979) ("[T]he concept of a Walrasian auction [market] is implicit in many models of financial
market equilibrium. . . ."). Walras's Law requires the market to clear. See MAUREEN O'HARA,
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 4 (1995) ("[T]he Walrasian auctioneer does not take any trad-
ing position, but serves only to redirect quantities from sellers to buyers."). Professor Stout's pseu-
do-market does not clear because her buyers and sellers have no budget constraints.
20. WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 3 (6th ed. 1994) ("[T]he problem
of scarcity [of resources] is a universal one. Economic tools can help us understand the choices that
necessarily arise in the face of such scarcity.").
21. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 24 (2d ed. 1997) ("Having more
of one thing requires giving up something else. Scarcity is a basic fact of life.").
22. This necessity for sacrifice could be a contributing reason why economics has been pejora-
tively labeled "the dismal science." See generally ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY
PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES, AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 75-104 (6th ed.
1986) (titling chapter four "The Gloomy Presentiments of Parson Malthus and David Ricardo"); cf
Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 253 ("Perhaps commentators who wish to reevaluate the utili-
ty of economic analysis in law have a cognitive bias. Although they know life is full of difficult
choices that must be made, they do not like to make them and do not like to have economists remind
them of this basic fact.").
23. I will describe just two here. In one article, Professor Stout argued that an efficient stock
market is not important to corporations because it raises their capital in negotiated transactions.
Stout, Economic Analysis, supra note 14, at 643-44. In another article, Professor Stout incorrectly
interpreted a finance professor's finding (that empirical evidence demonstrated that a line is less
steep than predicted by theory) to mean that the empirical line showed a negative relationship where
theory predicted a positive relationship. Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks:
CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475,
488 & n.40 (1997) (misstating the writing of Edward R. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of
Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1157 (1977)). For other documented mistakes, see Mark Klock, Dead
Hands-Poison Catalyst or Strength-Enhancing Megavitamin? An Analysis of the Benefits of Mana-
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her boldest fallacious assertion ever, she writes, "When we acknowledge
disagreement while still assuming perfect markets, price-moving arbitrage of
the sort assumed by many commentators becomes impossible. Indeed, mar-
ket equilibrium becomes impossible."24 It is an understatement to label this
assertion incorrect. The assertion is preposterous and reflects a misunders-
tanding about the definition of equilibrium, among other things. Equili-
brium means that the status quo is stable, nothing more.25 It need not be op-
timal; indeed, there need not be any market activity at all to achieve market
equilibrium. 26 Moreover, a market failure can be market equilibrium. 27 Al-
ternatively, well-functioning markets can also result in equilibrium. To mo-
tivate interest in the topic, I point out that when markets clear-supply
equals demand-we have equilibrium. 28 Casual observation indicates that
this routinely happens on a daily basis in the most liquid financial markets
even in the presence of investor disagreement, and hence Professor Stout's
assertion that this is impossible is contradicted on its face by a vast amount
of data.
Professor Stout outdoes herself in "proving" her fallacy with an example
that rises to a new level of audaciousness in pseudo-economic model build-
ing:
[I]magine a simple market with only one security, stock issued by
Widget Corporation at $100 per share. Assume there are only two
investors: Bull, who thinks Widget is worth $101, and Bear, who
thinks Widget [is] worth $99. With no wealth limitations, transac-
tions costs, or short sales restrictions, even this very modest disa-
greement makes an equilibrium price impossible. Bull will see the
chance to buy "undervalued" Widget stock as a money machine,
and will buy and buy until the supply of Widget stock is exhausted.
The supply will never be exhausted, however, because Bear simul-
taneously sees a chance to make money by selling Widget short,
gerial Protection and the Detriments ofJudicial Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 67, 147-
54 [hereinafter Klock, Dead Hands].
24. Stout, New Finance, supra note 15, at 97 (proving that equilibrium is impossible in a perfect
market with heterogeneous expectations) (emphasis added).
25. See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 320
(2002) [hereinafter Klock, Unconscionability] (explaining economists' concept of equilibrium); see
also HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 8 (1987) (explaining that equilibrium
means that no changes in behavior will be observed).
26. See Mark Klock, The SEC s New Regulation ATS Placing the Myth of Market Fragmenta-
tion Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 778 (1999) ("Many securities
do not trade that frequently, so prices adjust without being observed.").
27. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechan-
ism, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488, 490 (1970) (explaining conditions that can lead to an equilibrium in which
no transactions occur at any price level).
28. Klock, Unconscionability, supra note 25, at 320.
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and borrows and borrows it (presumably from Bull) to sell it short
(again, to Bull). Bull and Bear thus place infinite bets against each
other and no equilibrium emerges.
There are many problems with this "market." A model of a market, or
anything else, requires at least one endogenous variable-a variable that is
determined by the model.30 Professor Stout's model has all of the variables
set exogenously-by her assumptions.3' Her assumptions go well beyond
the art of simplification and abstraction from reality.3 2  Professor Stout
creates her example market in such a manner that it is not permitted to func-
tion. Not only are her assumptions not real, they are not even theoretically
possible." The essence of my complaint with her "simple market" is that
there is nothing economic about it. Nowhere in economics does the assump-
tion of perfect markets include unlimited wealth. Selling short requires col-
lateralized credit, and no one can short infinite amounts because no one can
provide infinite collateral. Professor Stout's version of law and economics
is better termed law and pseudo-economic nonsense. All of economics is
about one thing only-the allocation of resources under conditions of scarci-
ty.34
29. Stout, New Finance, supra note 15, at 97-98 (emphasis added) (proving that equilibrium is
impossible in a perfect market with heterogeneous expectations).
30. See ALPHA C. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 9 (2d ed.
1974). Professor Chiang explains the proper construction of an economic model:
Properly constructed, an economic model can be solved to give us the solution values of a
certain set of variables.. . . Such variables, whose solution values we seek from the
model, are known as endogenous variables (originating from within). However, the
model may also contain variables which are assumed to be determined by forces external
to the model, and whose magnitudes are accepted as given data only; such variables are
called exogenous variables (originating from without).
Id.
31. See Stout, New Finance, supra note 15, at 97 (fixing the price of Widget at $ 100, the quantity
that Bull wishes to buy at that price as infinite, and the quantity that Bear wishes to sell at that price
as infinite).
32. See generally Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 188-94 (describing the simplifying and
abstracting role of models and their assumptions).
33. I would have thought it obvious that one cannot borrow and sell short more stock than that
which is actually in existence. But this is apparently not so, as is evidenced by the fact that other
editors have also published Professor Stout's completely exogenous Widget model. See Lynn A.
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L.
635, 642-43 (2003) [hereinafter Stout, Mechanisms] (earlier publication of Professor Stout's ex-
ogenous simplified market model). I should also mention that Bull and Bear's ability to create off-
setting futures contract positions on Widget will be constrained to a finite amount due to their li-
mited wealth and their inability to meet infinite margin requirements.
34. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 187-88.
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There is an explicit assumption in Professor Stout's simplified "econo-
my" where both participants have access to infinite resources-she has no
wealth constraints in her model.3 ' This assumption is not artistic because it
extracts the example from the realm of economics even though it is pre-
sented as an economic model. If both investors have infinite wealth, they
would have no incentive to trade regardless of their beliefs. They would not
have to make any choices. They could have everything without sacrificing
anything. Yet making choices is precisely the essence of economics. The
economist's standard assumption that investors prefer more to less is applied
only where resources are scarce.38 Infinity plus epsilon is not better than in-
finity.39 It does not make any sense to talk about a world with no wealth
constraints. It is not a simplifying assumption. It is an assumption that as-
sumes away the problem. And when the problem has been assumed away, it
is somewhat disingenuous to complain that there is no equilibrium solution
to the problem. Professor Stout's argument is akin to arguing that when
x=3, x is not equal to 2 and no equality can exist between 2 and x. The logic
is true, but only because the lone variable has been exogenously fixed at a
value of 3. It is not a model. Professor Stout has created the ultimate irrele-
vant tautology-there is no equilibrium because she defined the market to
not clear.
To illuminate the flaw in the story that Bull and Bear make infinite book
against each other, consider an alternative situation. Suppose that Bear owns
a used car which she values at $9,900 and Bull values the car at $10,100.
Suppose that Bull purchases the car from bear for $10,000 and happily be-
lieves that she has profited $100 from the transaction. Bear also believes
that she has profited by $100. Is it reasonable to suppose that Bull would
now lend the car to Bear and purchase it again for an additional $10,000,
making another $100 profit? Of course not, but a practitioner of the "new
finance" will contend that the used car example is different from the Widget
hypothetical. But is it really? Suppose that Widget Corporation's sole asset
is this very same car. Once Bull has purchased all of the stock of Widget at
a bargain price, she owns the car outright. There is no more point in lending
the stock to repurchase at the bargain price than there is in lending the car to
35. See Stout, New Finance, supra note 15, at 97 (emphasis added); see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1849
(1994) (arguing price norms should be set based on a community's sense of morality); see also
sources cited supra note 14.
37. See STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 24 (defining economics as the study of how choices are
made, and observing that scarcity is the reason choices are inevitable).
38. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 243 ("One role of the 'more is preferred to less'
assumption is nonsatiation-utility is never maximized.").
39. See THOMAS E. COPELAND ET AL., FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY app. D at
933 (4th ed. 2005) ("[L]im as X - 00 of[(X+1)/X]=1.").
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repurchase for another economic profit. This illustrates that although the
value of financial securities depends on future cash flows, the value of fi-
nancial securities cannot logically be detached from the underlying assets
that generate those cash flows. Valuing uncertain future cash flows is diffi-
cult, and people can get so lost in the details that they forget about the fun-
damentals.
That Professor Stout's "simple market" is not an economic model is a
fact, not an opinion. This type of pseudo-economics is troubling primarily
because it is based not on differences of opinion but on invalid reasoning.40
It is poor thinking. Lawyers are trained to hone their critical reasoning.4 It
appears that some writers can more easily get away with faulty arguments
when those arguments are placed in an economic context because many
people will not attempt to understand economics.42 Perhaps this is to be ex-
pected because the necessity of making choices is unpleasant and economics
is the dismal science.43 But hope springs eternal.
To provide a bit of additional motivation for this paper, I note that Pro-
fessor Stout's "New Finance" is creating harm in both courts and academic
literature. The Bull and Bear hypothetical has actually been quoted in secur-
ities litigation in a federal district court." Two other federal courts have also
cited the hypothetical.45  Additionally, I have identified no less than forty-
eight non-self-citing works containing references to the paper.46
40. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 184 (describing how flawed economic analysis by
legal commentators often translates into poor advocacy and poor reasoning).
41. See id at 236 ("As lawyers we are trained. . . to persuasively argue ... with the available
evidence and law.").
42. See Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Inside Trading, 10
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 319 (1994) [hereinafter Klock, Mainstream Economics] ("It is difficult to
imagine that legal scholars would comment on extremely technical scientific or medical principles
without either familiarizing themselves with the material or consulting with an expert. Yet legal
scholars appear to have done this extensively with respect to the principles of economics.").
43. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 245 ("The objectionable element of economics for
many commentators is that it presumes behavior is governed by an incentive system, which is the
logical consequence of the fact that resources are scarce and choices must be made."); see also supra
note 22 and accompanying text (explaining how economics came to be known as "the dismal
science").
44. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Stout,
Mechanisms, supra note 33, at 642-43).
45. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Stout, Mechan-
isms, supra note 33, at 639); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc.,
No. 05-1898, 2006 WL 2161887, at *6 n.73 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006) (quoting Stout, Mechanisms,
supra note 33, at 639), affd, 546 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2008).
46. See, e.g., William o. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time
ofMadness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 977 n.357 (2005). The articles were identified with a LexisNexis
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This Article seeks to further dispel some common misconceptions about
economic models with clear exposition as to how some economic rules of
thumb have been oversimplified and applied out of context. Throughout this
Article, examples of both poor models and better models are used to help
communicate this point. Section II reviews the debate over whether individ-
uals are rational.47 Section III reviews the debate over whether markets are
rational. 4 8 Section IV discusses the desirability of replacing market func-
tions with political processes.4 9 Section V provides an analysis of the roles
assumptions play in the artistic aspect of economic science and how unrea-
sonable assumptions can lead to what I call pseudo-economic nonsense.5  A
summary conclusion comprises Section VI.5'
II. THE RATIONAL MAN ASSUMPTION
The subject of economics is decision making under conditions of scarci-
ty.52 Economists are interested in the problem of choosing between alterna-
tives-situations in which one must sacrifice one alternative in order to con-
sume another alternative." If an individual has no constraint, a
circumstance which would allow her to consume everything without giving
up anything, then the individual is very fortunate indeed and has no econom-
ic problem to confront. Unfortunately, none of us is in exactly that situation;
few of us face a situation that could even be approximately described as hav-
ing unbounded choices.54 Even Bill Gates and Warren Buffett must choose
between keeping their wealth and giving it away, and, in the latter case, they
must again choose to which of many worthy charities they shall give."
The observation that resources are scarce and choices must be made be-
tween alternatives-sacrificing some alternatives in order to attain others-
is the starting point for economics. 6 Whenever these are not the conditions
being described, two things can be said: first, we are not in the realm of eco-
search on (Lynn w/2 Stout) AND (New w/l Finance) and verified by examination.
47. See infra notes 52-115 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 116-194 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 195-272 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 273-328 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 329-335 and accompanying text.
52. NICHOLSON, supra note 20, at 3.
53. See STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 24.
54. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 187-88 ("[I]t is an undisputed fact that resources
are in fact finite.").
55. See Audrey Hudson, Buffett Gift Catapults Gates in Philanthropy, WASH. TIMES, June 27,
2006, at A4 (reporting on choices Warren Buffett made before giving thirty billion dollars to the
Gates Foundation and on choices the Foundation subsequently made about spending the money).
56. JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 14 (1976) ("The all-pervasive eco-
nomic problem is that of scarcity.").
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nomics; second, we are not in the real world.17 And so, when commentators
describe economists as disconnected from the real world and subsequently
pontificate about conditions of infinite resources, economists must impeach
the credibility of those economic critics.
The task of impeaching the credibility of pseudo-economic model build-
ers does not require defending against caricatures of economic man. The
economist's rational man is often caricaturized as a selfish calculator of per-
sonal utility. 8 Although economists do, at times, postulate worlds inhabited
by such people, this is done for expositional simplification in the presenta-
tion of a model. The truth is that economic methodology can be applied to
people who are compassionate and emotional as well as to rats and pigeons,
which are not likely to be better calculators of personal utility than people. 59
Economists seek to do more than simply observe that choices must be
made; they strive to make accurate predictions about how changing the envi-
ronment will change the decisions .60 For example, suppose a climate change
causes oranges to become increasingly scarce and apples more plentiful. A
reasonable prediction would be that as the price of oranges rises the price of
apples will fall, causing people to buy more apples and fewer oranges.61 In
57. See id. Professor Hirshleifer explains:
Not all desired things are available to individuals, the ultimate decision-making agents,
when and as desired. Even if all desired physical commodities were present in unlimited
quantities, we would not have enough time to enjoy them all. It is the fact of scarcity that
forces us to make economic decisions, that is, to organize our efforts ....
Id.
58. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2003) (portraying
economic thinking as this caricature).
59. See EDWIN G. DOLAN IN COLLABORATION WITH DAVID E. LINDSEY, BASIC ECONOMICS 4-5
(3d ed. 1983) (stating that economics can be broadly humanistic and is about effective actions to
achieve ends); JOHN H. KAGEL ET AL., ECONOMIC CHOICE THEORY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 2 (1995) ("[T]he fact that, when put to the test, rats and pigeons conform to
elementary principles of economic theory provides rather striking support for the theory and, indi-
rectly, refutes the argument that the theory cannot be extended to nonmarket behavior. . . .").
60. See EUGENE SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICS: A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 2
(1978). Professor Silberberg states: "Economics, first and foremost, is an empirical science. Posi-
tive economics is concerned with questions of fact, which are in principle either true or
false.... Positive economics consists of propositions which are to be tested against facts, and either
confirmed or refuted." Id.
61. This prediction is reasonable because demand curves are downward sloping-meaning that
people will want to purchase less of a commodity at a higher price. Under this hypothetical, oranges
have become more expensive in relation to the number of apples that must be sacrificed in order to
consume an orange. Cf STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 78 ("Candy bars and granola bars can also be
considered substitutes, as the two goods satisfy a similar need. Thus, an increase in the price of gra-
nola bars makes candy bars relatively more attractive . . . .").
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order to formally demonstrate this intuitive result, economists employ what
is known as the model of utility maximization.62 Within this model, individ-
uals are assumed to have a utility function, and they are to select from the
feasible alternatives the choices which maximize their utility.
Historically, economists did conceive of utility as a measure of satisfac-
tion."6 Over time, however, it became clear that the conclusions drawn from
economic models did not depend on this concept. 6 5 All that is required in
modem economic theory is the expression of a preferred ordering of alterna-
tives, without measuring satisfaction.66 The utility function is merely a me-
thod of expressing the mapping of preferences into an ordered set, and any
arbitrarily chosen utility function that preserves the ordering will lead to the
same results.
Moreover, it does not matter whether a person actually calculates her
utility to see whether she has maximized it.68 What matters is whether her
behavior can be predicted by the utility maximization model. 6 9 To say that
her behavior is determined by her mood of the moment does not aid in econ-
omists' efforts to predict actions and modify them.o Similarly, it is not im-
portant whether individuals are completely rational all of the time; what mat-
ters instead is whether market outcomes can be predicted based on the
assumption of rationality."
In order to actually apply this utility maximization model to descriptive
statements and predictions about behavior, economists need to constrain the
62. See generally HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 56, at 54-74 (providing a reasonably concise and
accessible treatment of utility theory).
63. See id at 58 (explaining that utility maximization means selecting the most preferred bundle
of goods from among the available choices, and is equivalent to the rules of rational choice). For a
discussion of the theory of rational choice, see infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
64. VARIAN, supra note 25, at 52.
65. Id. at 52-53.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id at 54-55.
68. See STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 7 (2d ed. 1996) ("[E]conomic actors
need only act as ifthey are maximizing utility or profits for [economists'] theories to work.").
69. STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 187; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 14-16 (1953); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset
Prices: A Theory ofMarket Equilibrium Under Conditions ofRisk, 19 J. FIN. 434 (1964).
70. Cf SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 215 ("[T]he stupidity hypothesis, and the disequilibrium
or slow adjustment hypotheses are consistent with all observable behavior, and therefore are unable
to generate refutable implications. Anything in the world can be explained on the basis that the par-
ticipants are stupid, or ill-informed, or slow to react, or are somehow in disequilibrium, without
theories to describe the ... alleged phenomena. These terms are metaphors for a lack of useful
theory or the failure to adequately specify the additional constraints on consumers' behavior.").
71. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 187, 192 (explaining that economic models are just
aids to the exploration and prediction of behavior, much as the scales of justice are an unrealistic
model that nevertheless have utility in determining trial outcomes).
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behavior of the function.72 If economists were to conclude that people must
make choices and those choices are made randomly, then economics would
not provide a very satisfactory model of human behavior.73 This would be
akin to stating that people behave as they do and we have no idea how to ex-
plain it.7 4 Ergo, economists make some simplifying assumptions about the
utility function." Three of these assumptions are considered the most gen-
eral and least restrictive possible.76 The first is that between any two choic-
es, a person knows whether those choices are equivalent or not, and if not,
she knows which is better.77 That is, a person can state that A is preferred to
B, or B is preferred to A, or that A and B are equivalent. Simply stated,
the first assumption is that the individual knows her own preferences.7 ' The
second and third assumptions demonstrate that preferences are both transi-
tive and reflexive.80 This means that if A is preferred to B, B is not preferred
to A; and also that if A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A must
be better than C."' The final assumption, that of reflexivity, also shows if
two alternatives are identical, except that one has more of something in it,
the one with more must be preferred to the one with less.82
These assumptions are the cornerstones of rational behavior for an
economist. 83 Essentially, rationality merely requires some degree of consis-
72. See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 475 (1997)
("[E]conomic theory is generally not specific about functional forms."); KAGEL ET AL., supra note
59, at 3 ("[T]ests of the theories' predictions are conditional on the validity of the functional form of
the estimating equations."); HENRI THELL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMETRICS 542 (1971) (explaining
that economic theory provides little guidance as to functional forms).
73. Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 5, at 1552 (suggesting that a problem confronting beha-
vioral law and economics scholars is that they have no theory).
74. See id. at 1560 ("If a theory cannot be falsified, neither it nor its predictions can be validated,
for everything that happens is by definition consistent with the theory.").
75. See VARIAN, supra note 25, at 35 ("Economists usually make some assumptions about the
consistency' of consumers' preferences. For example, it seems unreasonable-not to say contradic-
tory-to have a situation where .... the consumer strictly prefers the x-bundle to the y-
bundle. . . and vice-versa.") (second ellipsis in original).
76. See id. ("Some of the assumptions about preferences are so fundamental that we can refer to
them as 'axioms' of consumer theory.").
77. See id The three fundamental axioms of consumer preferences are: completeness (hardly
objectionable), reflexivity (trivial), and transitivity (problematic). Id
78. See id. (describing the axiom of completeness).
79. Id.
80. See id. (describing the axiom of reflexivity as trivial and describing the axiom of transitivity).
81. Id. at 35-36.
82. See id. at 41-44 (discussing the concept of satiation and observing that the interesting region
of preferences is the area of nonsatiation).
83. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 56, at 58 ("[T]he Laws of Preferences are really rules of ration-
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tency in choices.84 Consider an example in which a person who finds herself
in a restaurant with a menu containing three selections only, all at the same
price. If the person were to prefer the first selection to the second, and the
second to the third, and the third to the first, her preferences would violate
the assumption of rationality.85 This person would be unable to make a se-
lection because, given any decision, a better choice would always exist.86 It
does not seem altogether unreasonable to define such behavior as irrational
and then assume it out of existence.
Yet many commentators are writing about a growing body of empirical
evidence suggesting that people are not rational. These authors want policy
makers to conclude that economic theory is flawed, and thus, law and policy
based on economic theory is flawed. One legal scholar writes: "One of the
most prominent conclusions of much of the law and economics literature
seems to be that interference in the market needs some type of special justi-
fication."8  This conclusion is also reflected in the economic literature of
public finance.88 Commentators, now armed with a body of literature on be-
havioralism, are using the label of irrationality to justify interference in the
market. As Professor Ribstein observes, "The field of behavioral
finance .... challenges the efficient capital markets hypothesis that securi-
ties prices approximate fundamental asset values."89
I will collectively refer to those commentators, who argue that the most
highly liquid U.S. capital markets are not efficient and do not well approx-
imate fundamental value, as behavioralists. They draw heavily on literature
that has come to be called "behavioral finance" and "behavioral law and
economics." 90
al choice . . . .").
84. See Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 5, at 1551 (noting that rationality merely requires
behavior consistent with one's objective).
85. See Mark Klock, Is it "The Will of the People" or a Broken Arrow? Collective Preferences,
Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing Post-Balloting Litigation
Absent Specific Allegations ofFraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 15 (2002) [hereinafter Klock, Will of
the People] (describing the paradox of voting).
86. Id.
87. Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON REv. 35, 39 (2005)
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568 (5th ed. 1998)).
88. See RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 4 (1981) ("[T]he com-
petitive market economy is seen as the ideal economic system, so much so that competitive market
failure is a necessary condition for public sector activity.").
89. Ribstein, Noisy Market, supra note 9, at 138.
90. The term behavioralist is perhaps inappropriate, but it has established permanence in the de-
veloping literature. For an expanded discussion of this terminology, see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO L.J. 67, 78-83 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Perfect Rationality]. Pro-
fessor Mitchell prefers the term "legal decision theorists" to behavioralists. See id. at 78.
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One commentator summarily describes economic theory as a new legal
fiction and criticizes courts' reliance on it.9' Peter Smith summarizes the li-
terature:
In the years since the Court relied on the efficient-capital-market
hypothesis, however, scholars have increasingly cast doubt on the
descriptive accuracy of the robust version of the theory. The theory
is premised on traditional economic principles, including the prin-
ciple that "all human behavior involves participants who seek to
maximize their utility." In the last few decades, however, scholars
of behavioral economics have endeavored to show that actual hu-
man behavior is characterized by "bounds" that limit the extent to
which people actually and effectively pursue utility maximization.
Scholars have applied behavioral economics to investor behavior in
particular, finding many examples of investor irrationality. In addi-
tion, scholars in the field of behavioral finance, a subdiscipline of
behavioral economics, have produced significant evidence that
markets are affected by the biases that affect individual behavior.
Empirical evidence has substantially undermined the strong version
of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis.92
Indeed, there are many examples in the literature of allegedly irrational
behavior. Among the most popular is overconfidence, which has been
linked relationally to marriage decisions,94 driving ability,95 and investing
ability. 96 Examples of overconfidence often come from surveys in which
people claim to consider themselves better than average in some respect.97
91. Smith, Fictions, supra note 13, at 1456.
92. Id. at 1456-57 (footnotes omitted).
93. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 655 (1999) (listing multiple examples of unreason-
ably optimistic expectations about the future); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Beha-
vioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 139 (1997) (discussing "excessive optimism and overconfidence").
94. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations ofDivorce at the Time ofMarriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440 (1993).
95. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 216 ("Nearly ninety percent of drivers believe they drive bet-
ter than average.").
96. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Com-
mon Stock Investment, 116 Q. J. EcON. 261, 262 (2001).
97. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 216-18 (listing multiple examples of this type of survey evi-
dence).
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Although there is some basis for arguing that people are overconfident,
this conclusion must be treated with skepticism.98 If all people assert they
are better than average at driving a car, that does not necessarily mean they
tend to overestimate their driving ability. One simple explanation might be
that driving has different dimensions and people fixate on the dimensions
they are good at and ignore the others. Also, the fact that most people state
that they are better than average drivers would be entirely consistent with a
tendency to underestimate the driving ability of others. Furthermore, this
type of data regarding overconfidence could simply mean that people are
bad at answering such questions, and thus might not give us any information
about how people actually drive.99 If overconfidence is really that extreme,
why do we not observe more accidents and injuries?'00
In order to state that overconfidence in answering survey questions
translates into irrational behavior, two difficult tasks must be met. First, one
must rule out alternative theories consistent with the same observation (e.g.,
that people simply underestimate others' ability rather than overestimate
their own skill), and second, one needs to explain how the existing facts (that
accident rates are not insanely high) fit within the theory.' 0' Stated another
way, using this survey data to argue that individuals systematically overes-
timate their skill requires us to assume that they are able to accurately esti-
mate others' skill. Financial economists call this the joint hypothesis prob-
lem. 10
Another weakness in the argument that some data is consistent with irra-
tional behavior-and therefore we must abandon all conclusions of econom-
ics-is that it overlooks an impressive body of literature that suggests beha-
vior can often be more rational than we might expect. 03 Studies of children,
psychotics, and alcoholics indicate a strong tendency to make rational deci-
sions.'s" Moreover, studies of animals, such as pigeons, rats, fish, indicate
98. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 227 ("It should ... be noted that there are good rea-
sons for treating survey evidence about behavior with skepticism. Even if the survey instrument is
unbiased and respondents are truthful and know the true answer, the survey may elicit evidence
about their average motivation rather than their marginal motivation.").
99. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say? Implica-
tions for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC) 67, 71 (2001) ("[A] large
experimental literature by and large supports economists' skepticism of subjective questions.").
100. Cf Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 226 ("The problem with the story that people are
rational in some decisions and not in others is that it is consistent with any observations and couldjustify any rule of law.").
101. See generally id. at 220-36 (discussing the problem of differentiating between evidence
against a theory of behavior and misspecification of the underlying objective function).
102. Id. at 205-06.
103. See id at 222 ("[T]here are also an enormous number of studies suggesting that alcoholics,
psychotics, children, and animals engage in rational economic behavior.").
104. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 56, at 8 (citing T. Ayllon & N. H. Azrin, The Measurement and
Reinforcement of Behavior of Psychotics, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 357 (1965) (find-
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they too will make rational decisions.105 Indeed, it is irrational to abandon
centuries of economic learning on the call of commentators who point at se-
lected data sets while ignoring others. This disingenuous scholarship is a
form of data mining, which involves sifting through large amounts of data to
find a pattern and then cherry-picking the data that confirms the pattern
found. 106
It is always important to bear in mind that an economic model is very
much like a map.107 A map is a simplification of the world that necessarily
distorts it.108  For example, a Mercator map attempts to display the entire
planet on a flat sheet by reducing some distortion in land mass (keeping the
scale of land near the poles relatively the same as land near the equator) at
the expense of introducing more distortion in other dimensions (e.g., the vi-
sually perceived distance between Greenland and Alaska).' 09 Though pre-
suming the world to be flat is a useful approximation for a street map user
within a city, it might be a poor approximation for a submarine pilot navigat-
ing around the world. 0
Generally speaking, exceptions to a rule probe the rule, but do not nec-
essarily invalidate the usefulness of the rule."' As children, we learn "i" be-
ing psychotics work more for more incremental pay)); id at 98-99 (noting that psychologists have
found that alcoholics consume less alcohol as the price increases); see also Raymond C. Battalio et
al., A Test of Consumer Demand Theory Using Observations of Individual Consumer Purchases, 11
W. ECON. J. 411 (1973) (psychotics purchase less when prices rise), available at
http://www.econlab.arizona.edu/~jcox/reading/testconsumer.pdf.
105. See KAGEL ET AL., supra note 59, at 205 (pigeons and rats obey basic consumer choice
theory); Clayton M. Hodges & Larry L. Wolf, Optimal Foraging in Bumblebees: Why Is Nectar Left
Behind in Flowers?, 9 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 41, 41 (1981) (finding bumblebees ex-
hibit rational economic behavior); S.E.G. Lea, The Psychology and Economics of Demand, 85
PSYCHOL. BULL. 441 (1978) (surveying animal experiments in psychology related to economic be-
havior).
106. Michael C. Lovell, Data Mining, 65 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (1983).
107. KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 10 (5th ed. 1999); see also
infra note 290 and accompanying text.
108. CASE & FAIR, supra note 107, at 10-11.
109. See WEBSTER'S 11 NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 742 (1984) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S II].
110. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 190.
111. Dana Ziker, What Lies Beneath: An Examination of the Underpinnings of Dietary Supple-
ment Safety Regulation, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 282 n. 102 (2005). Ms. Ziker explains:
The common expression "the exception proves the rule" is actually a misstatement of the
original Latin "exceptio probat regulam," which translates to the more logical sentiment
"the exception probes the rule." The Latin "probare," a root for both the English words
"prove" and "probe," means to test or examine.
Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED (3d ed. 1993)). Zilker also derives some of her support from Dr. Madsen Pirie. Id.
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fore "e" except after "c" because, even though not always true, it is never-
theless useful. Similarly, the art of economic model building involves mak-
ing assumptions that are useful.1 12 This is inherently subjective, but it does
not mean we cannot identify examples of good and bad model-building." 3
A good model assumes that individuals will make consistent choices.l 14
However, making the assumption that people will borrow and lend infinite
amounts of a stock in fixed supply in order to bet on rigid, fixed beliefs
about the future when there is obvious uncertainty is not good model-
building. One does not need to be a lawyer to know that drowning a woman
to determine whether she is guilty of the crime of witchcraft is a poor me-
thod of assessing guilt."' Likewise, one need not be an economist to under-
stand that a world devoid of wealth constraints, where every variable is pre-
determined, is a poor model for teaching anything about market equilibrium.
III. FINANCIAL MARKETS
Commentators supporting the application of behavioral law and eco-
nomics to financial markets make three broad arguments. The first is that
because people are irrational, the markets in which people participate are
necessarily irrational."'6 The second argument alleges the existence of em-
pirical evidence suggesting that markets are not efficient in the sense that
they do not incorporate all publicly-available information." 7  The third ar-
Dr. Pirie explains his concept of the origin of the fallacy as follows:
The origin of the fallacy lies in the changing uses of language. The word "prove," which
is now taken to refer to establishing something beyond doubt, used to mean "test[.]"[]
Something would be "proved" to establish its quality; and this is the sense which has
passed down to us in this fallacy. The exception puts the rule to test and, if it is found to
be a valid exception, refutes it instead of proving it in the modem sense of the word[.]
MADSEN PIRIE, How TO WIN EVERY ARGUMENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LOGIC 63 (2006).
112. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an Interdiscipli-
nary Discourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 389, 397 ("The art of modeling or analysis is to know
which abstractions one can make and still capture the essential elements of the problem, or in other
words, which simplifying assumptions can be made and still preserve the essence of the problem for
the purpose of the analysis.").
113. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) ("I know [pornography] when I see it.. .(Stewart, J. concurring). Justice Stewart's often-quoted axiom helps to reconcile the benefit of es-
tablishing the boundaries of a good or acceptable model despite its inherent subjectivity.
114. See Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 69 (stating that the assumption of ratio-
nality is retained "for lack of a better alternative for prediction and policy analysis").
115. See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis:
Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 227,231-32 (1996) (noting the modern satirical use of this medieval methodology).
116. See Stout, Mechanisms, supra note 33, at 638 (suggesting that capital markets are not effi-
cient because not all market participants behave rationally).
117. See, e.g., David Hoffman, The "Duty" To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN L. REv. 537,
549 (2006) ("[I]mportant forms of human behavior are unlikely to be 'washed out' in the financial
markets."); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Effi-
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gument concedes that markets could be efficient in the sense of quickly in-
corporating all new information, but for the fact that markets inaccurately
incorporate information." 8 I consider this third argument to be another
strong example of pseudo-economic nonsense so I will dispense with it first,
and quickly, before providing analysis of the first two arguments.
If a market is efficient with respect to an information set, it means that
the expected value of an uncertain outcome conditional on that information
set is correct."9 To state that the market could incorporate the information
but does so inaccurately is like stating that an unbiased estimate can be bi-
ased. 20 This argument is nonsense. I believe that commentators have suc-
ceeded in publishing such statements because those commentators have cast
their statements within large amounts of economic jargon, which intimidates
econophobes into not analyzing the logic of the statement.' 2' Commentators
have advanced this story with seemingly plausible hypotheticals. For exam-
ple, one securities regulation scholar writes:
Suppose that investors are, in fact, not always rational and in-
stead suffer from some degree of behavioral biases. Investors of
such offerings are simply unable to handle factual and forward-
looking information. Overconfidence and the availability bias may
lead such investors to overweigh the importance of such informa-
tion. Bounded rationality may limit the ability of investors to look
ciency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 853-56 (1992) (suggesting that strong claims of market
efficiency are in doubt); James Lindgren, Telling Fortunes: Challenging the Efficient Markets Hypo-
thesis by Prediction, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 7, 12-18 (1992) (addressing the shortcomings in pre-
cious studies of market theory and the inefficiency of the markets in responding to new information);
Smith, Fictions, supra note 13, at 1456-57 ("[S]cholars ... have produced significant evidence that
markets are affected by the biases that affect individual behavior.").
118. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31
DEL J. CORP. L. 455, 498 (2006) ("[I]nformational efficiency does not mean that a stock price will
correctly incorporate all relevant information.").
119. Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 42, at 299, 300-01.
120. See Mark Klock, Finding Random Coincidences While Searching for the Holy Writ of Truth:
Specification Searches in Law and Public Policy or Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?, 2001 Wis L. REv.
1007, 1017 [hereinafter, Klock, Random Coincidences] (explaining the concept of unbiasedness).
121. The problem can also be attributed, in part, to commentators who write about a field in which
the terminology has a technical meaning. I do not deny that it is plausible (although unlikely) that
investors could react to an announcement that a hypothetical stock trading at $50 has received a ten-
der offer for $75 by driving the price down to $40. But it is not reasonable to argue that the new
price incorporates the information, just incorrectly. Logically speaking, incorporating information
inaccurately is equivalent to ignoring valuable information and not incorporating it. I believe most
logicians should understand this even without training in economics.
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closely at all the mandatory disclosure items once given other fac-
tual and forward-looking information.'2 2
This language is loaded with possibilities that cannot be tested.
My point is that if markets systematically underreact or overreact to
news, then they have not impounded all of the information because the sys-
tematic portion is an identifiable part of the information.123 If one wants to
hypothesize that markets react to news randomly, that individual would be
hard pressed to support such a proposition because it cannot be empirically
tested.124 The logical flaw with this reasoning is that commentators are hy-
pothesizing about what investors, absent any constraints, might believe and
then using plausible, unconstrained beliefs to demonstrate inconsistency.
These hypothetical inconsistencies are not possible in a market setting be-
cause a market is necessarily constrained by what economists call "adding
up" constraints, or Walras' Law.125 "Evidence" that the market did not accu-
rately evaluate the information always comes in the form of the price on an
earlier day in history that was very different from the price on a later day in
history.126  This is clearly not a ceteris paribus comparison, and it is not
possible to infer irrationality from such observations.127
Accurate valuation of common stock is difficult.12 8 In the simplest of
cases, such valuation depends on future cash flows, the riskiness of those
122. Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 85, 112-13 (2006).
123. See generally Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 42, at 299-302 (providing careful
exposition of the relation between information and market efficiency).
124. See SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 10 ("A theory which says that it will either rain or not
rain tomorrow is no theory at all.").
125. Id. at 521; see also Loewenstein & Willard, supra note 16, at 237-39 (explaining Walras's
Law).
126. See Robert E. Hall, Struggling to Understand the Stock Market, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS
& PROc) 1, 2 (2001) (Richard T. Ely Lecture given at the 2001 annual meeting of the American
Economic Association); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 141 (2002). Pro-
fessor Langevoort presents the following passage as evidence against market efficiency:
126. See infra notes 329-335 and accompanying text.
The Sunday, May 3, 1998 edition of the New York Times carried a front-page story about
EntreMed, a biotechnology company with licensing rights to an exciting medical break-
through. As a result of this conspicuous media attention, EntreMed's stock price rose
dramatically and stayed at the higher valuation, as did (to a somewhat lesser degree) the
prices of related biotech stocks. What is puzzling about this phenomenon is that the
Times article contained absolutely no "new news": everything in it had already been said,
albeit with less prominence, in earlier stories in the Times and in widely respected scien-
tific publications.
Id. at 140.
126. See infra notes 329-335 and accompanying text.
127. Hall, supra note 126, at 2.
128. See IVO WELCH, A FIRST COURSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (2008) (explaining why esti-
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cash flows, the market price of risk, and expected inflation.129 Each of these
things is uncertain and must therefore be estimated.130 It is not irrational for
people to have different estimates or to constantly reassess and revise these
estimates.' ' Small changes in beliefs about the future can cause large
changes in the present.132 When future cash flows depend on something as
tenuous as what people believe regarding whether, when, and who finds a
patentable cure for cancer, the fluctuations in value can be large without any
obvious or simple reason.133 But the fact that people make and change their
forecasts of the future does not mean that dramatic price increases and de-
creases are the result of irrational investors.134
I can offer another historical example. On August 3, 1981, a thirty-year
U.S. treasury bond that had been purchased in May of 1980 for $100,000
could be sold for $70,937.50.'13 This is a remarkably large drop in a rela-
tively short period on a security for which the time and amount of the pay-
ments are known precisely and with certainty.136 I was teaching introductory
economics at Boston College in 1981, and I am certain that no one at that
time suggested that investors had been pricing bonds irrationally in 1980. It
is therefore remarkable to me that, in the twenty-first century, legal com-
mentators are claiming that the price drop in the value of exceptionally un-
certain future cash flows in 2000 is evidence that investors were irrational in
1999.'13
mating value is important and difficult). See generally Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 94-
100 (discussing conceptual measurement issues in estimating the fair market value of a financial
asset).
129. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 99.
130. Id.
131. See Hall, supra note 126, at 2.
132. See id. at I ("Some types of corporate property, especially the types held by high-tech com-
panies, have values that are exquisitely sensitive to the future growth of the cash they generate.").
133. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 100 (explaining that knowledge capital has be-
come a larger component of the economy and leads to greater estimation uncertainty and stock value
volatility).
134. See Hall, supra note 126, at 10-11 (using eBay and Amazon as examples).
135. See WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1981, at 52.
136. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 108 (6th ed. 1999) ("A useful first step in
understanding security valuation is to consider riskless securities, which are those fixed-income se-
curities that are certain of making their promised payments in full and on time... . [Tihe obvious
candidates for consideration as riskless securities are the securities that represent the debt of the fed-
eral government.").
137. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 781
(2006); see also Fisher, supra note 46, at 847 ("During the bubble, the market professionals imposed
no such rationality, and in fact the market acted irrationally, with stock prices far away from funda-
mental values."); Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78
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I now return to the first of these commentators' arguments, that because
individuals are not rational, markets are necessarily irrational. There are two
problems with this line of reasoning. The first is that it assumes a false fact.
As I noted previously, a large body of literature reporting on the study of
rats, pigeons, and other animals shows that those animals make rational eco-
nomic decisions.1 8 Other literature demonstrates that children, psychotics,
alcoholics, and prisoners all make rational economic decisions." 9 Moreo-
ver, Richard Posner has demonstrated that even things ordinarily not the
subject matter of economics are still governed by economic rules and ration-
al economic behavior.140 As one example, Judge Posner demonstrates that
homosexual activity increases when the price of heterosexual sex rises. 141
The evidentiary history of people behaving rationally is long and strong,
whereas evidence that people are irrational is short-in-coming and flawed.14 2
One legal scholar and accomplished psychologist has written extensive-
ly on the topic of behavioral law and economics' claim that rationality is not
real. Professor Gregory Mitchell states:
[T]he greater realism of behavioral law and economics is more illu-
sion than reality. In fact . .. the equal incompetence assumption is
not faithful to the empirical data on judgment and choice and,
moreover, cannot lay claim to empirical validity superior to that of
the perfect rationality assumption. Behavioral law and economics
bases its model of bounded rationality on a very limited set of em-
pirical data and draws unsupportable conclusions about human na-
ture from this partial data set. Behavioral law and economics scho-
lars simplify and overgeneralize findings on human cognition and
rationality to make these findings seem simultaneously important
and simple enough to be incorporated into legal policy. Remarka-
bly, despite the amazing breadth and boldness of many of the em-
TEX L. REv. 777, 785-86 (2000) (describing nearly unbelievable stock volatility in the technology
sector in the late 1990s).
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
140. Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Homosexuality, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND
FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 173, 173-74 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 1997) ("The more intense a person's sexual appetite is, the more he will value sexual activity
over other activities, while the structure of his sexual preferences will affect the value he attaches to
different forms and objects of sexual activity and also to a variety of.. .sexual partners.").
141. Id. at 174.
142. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907, 1911 (2002) [hereinafter Mit-
chell, Unwarranted Pessimism] ("Simply put, the empirical research does not support the dire pro-
nouncements of legal scholars regarding the human capacity for irrational behavior. Just as troub-
ling as the overreaching claims about human cognition that these scholars make is their uncritical
acceptance by others.").
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pirical claims made by advocates of behavioral law and economics,
the validity of these empirical claims has largely gone untested
within the legal academy.143
Given that behavioral law and economics advocates have misunderstood
economic theory and taken statistical evidence out of context, it should not
be surprising that they have also overgeneralized results taken from the psy-
chology literature.
Much of the evidence supporting the behavioralists' contention that
people are not rational is based on survey evidence.'" It is well-known that
survey evidence regarding hypothetical choices is not reliable.145  Ask a
worker whether she wants a one hundred dollar increase in pay or a one
hundred dollar increase in her employer's contribution to her health insur-
ance and she might well reply that she wants both choices.146 But give her a
deadline by which to select one of the two choices or forfeit the hundred dol-
lars and she will meet that deadline.147 One study conducted by economics
professors at The George Washington University found that reliance on stu-
dent surveys led to inaccurate predictions about students' actual behavior.148
In response to the well-known criticism of survey data, behavioralists
have been conducting more experiments in order to analyze real decisions
rather than hypothetical decisions.149  This methodology has unavoidable
143. Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 72.
144. See generally Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 227-35 (describing several surveys pur-
porting to expose irrationality in the general human population).
145. See id at 232 ("[Slurvey data is as notoriously unreliable as eyewitness testimony." (footnote
omitted)); id. at n.368 ("Anyone who believes that surveys provide good measurements should con-
sider the fact that Michael Moore, who gained fame for his portrayal of the coldness of corporate
decision making in Roger and Me, reported that thirty-eight percent of all Americans believe that
most serial killers are not all that bad." (citing THE AWFUL TRUTH (New Video Group 2000)).
146. See Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 5, at 1575 ("If you give a worker childbirth cover-
age, she'll like it (endowment effect); but if you don't give it to her, she'll dislike it (more precisely,
won't want to pay for it in lower wages).").
147. Cf id. at 1569 (observing that women given insurance are more likely to have more children
and more expensive medical treatment, taking whatever they can get at no additional cost).
148. See Anthony M. Yezer, Robert S. Goldfarb & Paul J. Poppen, Does Studying Economics
Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play, 10 J. ECON.
PERSP. 177, 177 (1996) ("In fact, the evidence in this paper implies that even if undergraduate stu-
dents of economics display uncooperative behavior in specialized games or surveys, their 'real-
world' behavior is actually substantially more cooperative than that of their counterparts studying
other subjects.").
149. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Alevy, Michael S. Haigh & John A. List, Information Cascades: Evi-
dence from a Field Experiment with Financial Market Professionals, 62 J. FIN. 151, 152 (2007) (ex-
perimenting with real decisions rather than hypothetical choices).
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problems of its own-experiments exploring behavior necessarily alter be-
havior.5 o People who are being watched behave differently than when they
are not being watched."' This is the basis for complaints about videotaping
in public. Such criticism is essentially what economists call the Lucas-
critique after Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas.15 2 As I explained in a previous
paper:
One of Lucas's fundamental insights was a criticism of economic
policy based on statistical estimates of economic models. This crit-
icism is widely known as the Lucas-critique. The criticism is that
policy decisions that are made by estimating a model and then in-
vestigating how a change in government policy will affect important
variables of interest is fundamentally flawed because if people are
rational (which in Lucas's terms means forward-looking), changes
in government policy will effect a change in behavior, or, in other
words, a change in the structural model.
... What this means is that choices that are revealed at different
points in time cannot be used to assess the rationality of the choices
because behavior will change in response to changing conditions.'
Professor Mitchell provides additional criticism of these experiments,
after observing that the subjects of experiments are not random and that be-
havior cannot be generalized across cultures 5 4 nor across situational differ-
ences.s55 Behavioral law and economics scholars draw misleading conclu-
sions from these experiments, causing Professor Mitchell to conclude:
For whatever reason, many legal scholars use insufficient care
and precision in their interpretations and uses of psychological re-
search on judgment and decision making. Consumers of this grow-
ing literature should thus look very skeptically on the claims being
made and should resist the contention that the cognitive-miser mod-
150. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 225.
151. See Alvin E. Roth, Introduction to Experimental Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 3, 70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (observing skeptic-
ism of experiments because subjects will speculate as to the purpose of the experiments).
152. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 224.
153. Id. at 224-25 (footnotes omitted).
154. See generally Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 147-56 (explaining why
"[c]ulture often exerts a strong influence on judgments and decisions.").
155. See generally id. at 105-19 (discussing the importance of situational differences on thought
and behavior).
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el being offered by these scholars is more complete and accurate
than the rational-actor model.156
Finally, it must be noted that any given set of facts can likely be ex-
plained by alternate theories.' Rationality in its essence means that people
behave in a manner consistent with their objectives.' 8  As economists, we
do not judge whether their objectives are rational. 5 9 Individual objectives
are governed by individual preferences and tastes.'" When we see behavior
that appears to be irrational, we cannot conclude that it is irrational unless
we can conclusively eliminate alternative explanations.' 6 ' A likely alterna-
tive explanation for seemingly irrational behavior is that we do not know the
individual's true objective.162 To demonstrate that people are not rational,
we need to see men, who want to make holes deeper, filling those holes with
dirt, or hungry women spending hours in a restaurant without eating because
they constantly change their menu selection.
Notwithstanding the fact that people are rational, the notion that irra-
tional individuals leads to an irrational market is flawed. This belief is prob-
ably rooted in the fact that theoretical proofs of market efficiency often be-
gin with a set of assumptions that includes rational individuals.163  The
assumptions of a proof are always sufficient conditions to establish the re-
sult.'" But they need not be required conditions.'16  In other words, a ra-
tional financial market does not require rational individual investors.'66 An
156. Mitchell, Unwarranted Pessimism, supra note 142, at 2020.
157. See SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 10 ("It is always possible that a new theory will be devel-
oped which will explain a given set of events.").
158. Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 5, at 1551.
159. See VARIAN, supra note 25, at 35-36 (economists' assumptions about preferences relate to
consistency, not reasonableness); see also supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
160. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 251.
161. See id. at 253-54 (explaining that even if our data reject the hypothesis that individuals are
acting against their self-interest, it is possible that we have incorrectly defined their self-interest).
162. Id. at 222.
163. Id. at 202.
164. Id.
165. Id
166. Richard Roll argues that even if individual people behave irrationally, markets can behave as
if everyone is rational, and he effectively draws on an example of how illogical behavior by termites
results in an organized colony. Richard Roll, What Every CFO Should Know About Scientific
Progress in Financial Economics: What Is Known and What Remains to Be Resolved, 23 FIN.
MGMT. 69, 72-73 (1994). The same argument is made with more formality and rigor by Mark Ru-
binstein. Mark Rubinstein, Rational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, 57 FIN. ANALYSTS
J. 15, 15 (2001). Professor Rubinstein writes :
With the recent flurry of articles declaiming the death of the rational market hypothesis, it
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admissible confession with corroborating facts is sufficient to establish guilt,
but it is not necessary. Likewise, a strong assumption might be sufficient to
establish the validity of a theory under unrealistic conditions, but it could
still be unnecessary for the theory to hold under realistic conditions.
Indeed, the most common form of irrational behavior that behavioralists
point to-overconfidence in ability-intuitively leads to a hyper-rational
market.167 That is, a hyper-rational market is more accurate than a market
without overconfident investors because the overconfidence results in over-
investment of resources in an effort to collect information.168  The intuition
is appealing, but the case has been persuasively set forth in Professor Ru-
benstein's careful and thoughtful article.169
As to the second argument, that empirical research shows markets to be
inefficient, I must admit that there is some empirical evidence that has been
interpreted as evidence of systematically incorrect asset pricing.o70  These
are purported anomalies.' 7 1 Asset pricing anomalies are not necessarily
proof that the market is inefficient.172 They are puzzles that warrant further
exploration.'73  One of the more famous anomalies is known as the "small
firm effect." 74 The story behind this anomaly is that small equity capitaliza-
is well to pause and recall the very sound reasons this hypothesis was once so widely ac-
cepted, at least in academic circles. Although academic models often assume that all in-
vestors are rational, this assumption is clearly an expository device not to be taken se-
riously. What is in contention is whether markets are "rational" in the sense that prices
are set as if all investors are rational. Even if markets are not rational in this sense, ab-
normal profit opportunities still may not exist. In that case, markets may be said to be
"minimally rational." I maintain that not only are developed financial markets minimally
rational, they are, with two qualifications, rational. I contend that, realistically, market
rationality needs to be defined so as to allow investors to be uncertain about the characte-
ristics of other investors in the market. I also argue that investor irrationality, to the ex-
tent that it affects prices, is particularly likely to be manifest through overconfidence,
which in turn, is likely to make the market "hyper-rational."
Id.
167. Donald Langevoort explains that "there is an increasing body of empirical evidence that di-
rectly supports investor overconfidence as an important trait." Langevoort, supra note 126, at 147.
168. Rubinstein, supra note 166, at 20 (investors overinvest in collecting information).
169. See generally id. at 15-29 (explaining financial market anomalies as consistent with rational
markets).
170. See STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 343 (4th ed. 2006) ("The
record on the efficient-market hypothesis is extensive, and in large measure it is reassuring to advo-
cates of the efficiency of markets.").
171. See Ray Ball, The Theory of Stock Market Efficiency: Accomplishments and Limitations, in
THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 2, 14-15 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 3d
ed., 1998) (describing the development of anomalies in the efficiency literature).
172. Id.
173. Id at 15.
174. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 249-51 (7th ed. 1999) (de-
scribing the tendency of small stocks to outperform large stocks in the past, but questioning whether
the relationship is causal, or whether it might even be an artifact of errors in risk measurement or
sample selection procedures).
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tion (market price multiplied by outstanding shares) firms appear to earn
higher rates of return than large equity capitalization firms, after adjusting
for risk.'7 ' An alternative explanation suggests that the risk-adjustment
process is systematically biased for small firms.176
Many stories could be told to explain why this might be the case. For
example, I hypothesize that small firms suffer more corporate governance
risk than large firms because they are not as closely scrutinized. Risk-
adjustment methods used by financial economists will not capture this be-
cause risk adjustment is based on historically observed covariances between
assets, and corporate governance crises for small firms are isolated events
that often result in the firm being taken over, taken private, or failing alto-
gether, and thus disappearing from the data.177
Other pricing anomalies, such as the "momentum effect" and the "rever-
sal effect," have gathered great attention in recent years and are proudly
waved by the behavioral fans.' 78 The stories of these two anomalies are sim-
ilar, but incompatible.179 The momentum effect finds that successful securi-
ties continue to do well, and the reversal effect finds that recent losers tend
to outperform recent winners. 80 The documented evidence supporting these
anomalies has been interpreted as suggesting small amounts of predictability
in stock returns.'
The simplified presentation of asset-pricing models that one might find
in an undergraduate or M.B.A. text states that market efficiency implies
changes in returns will be unpredictable.182 Typically omitted from this aca-
demic presentation is the fact that this prediction assumes a constant market
price of risk over time." Unless one has been immersed in sufficient quan-
175. Id. at 249-50.
176. Id. at 251.
177. See Ross ET AL., supra note 170, at 348 n.18 (explaining the role survivorship bias could
have in the small firm effect).
178. See Tarun Chordia & Lakshmanan Shivakumar, Momentum, Business Cycle, and Time-
varying Expected Returns, 57 J. FIN. 985, 985 (2002) ("A growing number of researchers argue that
time-series patterns in returns are due to investor irrationality and thus can be translated into abnor-
mal profits.").
179. See Robert Connolly & Chris Stivers, Momentum and Reversals in Equity-Index Returns
During Periods ofAbnormal Turnover and Return Dispersion, 58 J. FIN. 1521, 1521 n. 1 (2003) (de-
fining these anomalies in quantitative terms as opposites).
180. Id.
181. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 4 (2d ed. 2005) (suggesting that as a re-
sult of irrational investors we can predict a drop in the stock market).
182. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 337 (8th ed.
2006).
183. See Hall, supra note 126, at 4 (changing risk premiums causes predictability in stock re-
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titative methodology to be prepared to read and comprehend the academic
literature on asset pricing, one is likely to miss the importance of this simpli-
fying assumption.'84 Modest predictability is easily explained by small
changes in risk premiums over time.' 85 Risk premiums are likely to change
over time because of either changes in beliefs about the future or changing
demographics that affect tastes for immediate consumption and savings.'
Rational beliefs about the future are loosely constrained, and changing one's
belief about what will happen next year cannot be judged to be irrational.'87
Changing demographics that impact cultural preferences for more or less
savings relative to current consumption are also immune from a judgment of
irrationality. 88
In a comment on Professor Robert Prentice's claim of bringing together
"twenty-five years' worth of discipline-specific behavioral research in order
to demonstrate that a behavioral approach is dramatically more descriptive
[but not necessarily more predictive] of reality than the widely-accepted law
and economics approach," 89 Professor Mitchell writes:
When the empiricist rhetoric of behavioral law and economics is
compared to the full body of empirical data from which this rhetoric
flows, we are left with an unremarkable point made by behavioral
law and economics and a remarkable observation about behavioral
law and economics. That is, behavioral law and economics stresses
that conventional law and economics utilizes an empirically false
model of behavior-a point already acknowledged within law and
economics and championed years ago in regard to positive econom-
ics by Milton Friedman, one of the primary methodological influ-
ences on law and economics. Yet behavioral law and economics
seeks to replace this model with its own empirically false model of
behavior.' 90
turns).
184. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 72, at 80 (explaining that thirty years ago predictability in
returns would have been considered a rejection of rationality, but the modem financial economics
literature has taught us that predictability can be caused by rational factors such as time-varying pa-
rameters associated with changing business conditions).
185. Hall, supra note 126, at 4.
186. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 72 (suggesting "that the parameters ruling the
financial world are ... time-varying and sensitive to demographic changes").
187. See Hall, supra note 126, at 2 ("[R]ational beliefs about probabilities are only loosely con-
strained in a nonstationary world.").
188. See Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 154-55 (reporting on studies of cross-
cultural differences in the overconfidence bias and finding strikingly different results across cul-
tures).
189. Prentice, Behavioral Insight, supra note 3, at 135.
190. Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 74.
180
[Vol. 37: 153, 2010] Economic Science v. Pseudo-Economic Nonsense
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Some readers might argue that I treat market efficiency as a tautology
by arguing that asset pricing anomalies are perceived and not real, and by
placing the burden of disproving market efficiency conclusively on the be-
havioralists. This is incorrect. Market efficiency is not a tautology. It con-
tains a refutable proposition that no mechanical trading rules will systemati-
cally generate superior risk-adjusted returns after transactions costs.19 But
when many tests fail to refute the proposition and a few selected tests reject
the proposition less than dramatically, one should critically evaluate the test
methodology.192 Behavioralists who argue that efficient markets are a legal
fiction or that the efficient market hypothesis has been proven false have
clearly not met the burden of such strong claims. Alternatively, many beha-
vioralists make the weaker claim that market efficiency is controversial and
could be false, which also effectively undermines the law's reliance on mar-
ket efficiency.' 93 To those who might be persuaded by this seemingly rea-
sonable claim, I argue that logic-not blind faith-provides a compelling
reason to believe that publicly traded U.S. equities are priced efficiently.
The essence of the efficient market hypothesis is that there are no abnormal
returns (economic profits) to gathering information on mispriced securities.
In other words, if there is unclaimed money lying around that can be picked
up without effort and without loss of integrity, people will take it until it is
gone.194
191. See Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1583,
1584 (1989) ("[T]he doctrine of capital market efficiency contains the assertion that .... there are
no profitable trading rules.").
192. See generally Klock, Random Coincidences, supra note 120, at 1007-1065 (discussing the
invalidity of classical statistical methodology when performed in the context of a search).
193. See, e.g., David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 112 n.300 (2003) ("Robust versions of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis ('ECMH') have always been controversial, and support for them has waned in recent
years. Indeed, Enron's stratospheric rise and fall-the Enron bubble-itself calls ECMH into ques-
tion."); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1240 (2002)
("Enron disturbs the efficient market hypothesis."); Langevoort, supra note 126, at 136 ("[F]aith in
the EMH among economists has been weakening for some time.").
194. Cf Stephen A. Ross, The Interrelations of Finance and Economics: Theoretical Perspec-
tives, 77 AM. ECON. REv. (PAPERS & PRoc) 29, 32 (1987) ("The intuition underlying the efficient
market theories is the intuition of the lack of arbitrage [in a competitive equilibrium].").
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IV. THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT; ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM; AND
HOVENKAMP'S CRITIQUE
A. The Harm in Substituting Market Outcomes with Political Decisions
What harm could be caused if the law were to lose its reliance on the ef-
ficient market hypothesis as many behavioralists advocate? Many commen-
tators believe that this would result in a dismantling of current federal se-
curities laws.'95 I agree with this because the primary vehicle for redress of
securities fraud is the class action, which requires the fraud-on-the-market
theory to establish reliance. 196
Economic prosperity requires two preconditions that cannot be created
overnight: 1) a well-developed legal system that clearly defines and enforces
property rights, including intangible property; and 2) highly liquid financial
markets that enable capital to flow freely.' 97  Economic prosperity for the
nation benefits even the less fortunate with no wealth directly invested in the
financial markets.198 With poorly functioning markets, the costs of raising
capital are high, investment is unprofitable, and employment and tax reve-
nue are low.199
One cornerstone of the foundation of economic prosperity in the United
States has been our federal securities laws, first enacted in 1933 and 1934,
which are focused on policing fraud in the marketplace for securities.200
Fraud destroys markets. 20 1 Historically, U.S. markets have flourished under
a philosophy of full and fair disclosure that has been promoted by attaching
financial liability to the introduction of fraudulent statements into the mar-
195. See, e.g., Dunbar & Heller, supra note 118, at 532 (arguing that the market is not efficient at
times, and so the presumption of reliance on market price in securities class actions should be re-jected); Ribstein, Noisy Market, supra note 9, at 139 ("[B]ehavioral finance supports significant nar-
rowing of the fraud on the market theory.").
196. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) ("Requiring proof of individualized
reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respon-
dents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the
common ones. The District Court found that the presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-
the-market theory provided 'a practical resolution to the problem . . .
197. See Black, supra note 12, at 782-83.
198. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 75.
199. Id.
200. MARC 1. STEINBERG, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1 (4th ed. 2004).
201. See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 27, at 500 (arguing that in markets in which trust is important,
"informal unwritten guarantees are preconditions for trade and production" and "[w]here these guar-
antees are indefinite, business will suffer. . ."); Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 77 ("Fraud
increases the informational asymmetry and cannot only cause the market to function poorly, but it
can cause the market to cease to exist altogether.").
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ketplace.202 But in order to maintain a cause of action under federal securi-
ties laws, private plaintiffs must establish reliance on the fraudulent state-
ment.203 As a practical matter, this is routinely established by demonstrating
that the plaintiff made transactions in the public market at the market price
under the theory that in an efficient market the price incorporates all availa-
ble information (and misinformation). 20 Now, commentators are calling
this theory a legal fiction, claiming that our public equity markets are not ef-
ficient and those who invest in public corporations are not rational. 205 Ac-
ceptance of such assertions without critical analysis of the basis for making
them could greatly damage our ability to deter fraud in the marketplace un-
der the existing regulatory framework.
The direct federal securities law problem created by behavioralists' ar-
guments-making it impossible to establish reliance under the existing
law-could be addressed with a legislative response that involves creating
other avenues of redress for defrauded investors, at least in theory. There
are two far greater problems that fall out of the behavioralists' mischief.
The first is that such action constitutes a direct campaign of total war on the
underlying, fundamental philosophy that has served U.S. financial markets
so well since 1933.206 The second problem is implicit. If we are not going
to let financial markets allocate resources, those decisions must be made by
some alternative.207 The only alternative is the political market, and it is
well-known that the political market is highly irrational.208
The fundamental philosophy of federal securities law is one of nonpa-
ternalism-full and fair disclosure of all material information to a reasonable
investor for publicly traded securities.209 Under this philosophy, the role of
the law is to drive fraud out of the marketplace, protect the integrity of the
202. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 77.
203. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
204. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). The Court explains acceptance of the
theory: "The [fraud-on-the-market] presumption is also supported by common sense and probability.
Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any materi-
al misrepresentations." Id. (emphasis added).
205. Smith, Fictions, supra note 13, at 1456.
206. See STEINBERG, supra note 200, at 1 (stating that Congress expressly considered and rejected
merit regulation in favor of an honest market approach).
207. Cf Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 5, at 1575 ("Dare we vest responsibility for curing
irrationality in the irrational?").
208. See Klock, Will of the People, supra note 85, at 46-48 (describing instability problems with
political processes).
209. See STEINBERG, supra note 200, at 1.
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market, and promote investor confidence.210 It is this philosophy that led to
the prosecution of insider trading as a violation of law subject to both civil
and criminal penalties. 21 Although the illegality of insider trading was once
controversial, it is now settled law that has been so successful in fueling
growth in the U.S. economy that it has been thoroughly copied around the
globe.2 12 A formal mathematical treatment of investor confidence in the
marketplace was published in the American Economic Review in 1990 by
Lawrence Ausubel.213
The formal economic argument that supports a prohibition of insider
trading is complicated.214 The arguments are complicated because they rely
on secondary effects that occur in a general equilibrium where there is endo-
genous feedback across different markets.215 The simplest exposition that I
can provide is that insider trading reduces the ex ante expected returns of
outside investors.216 This shift in the payoff to investment lowers the
amount of capital that investors will be willing to supply in the market,217
which in turn raises the cost of capital to corporations and lowers the profit-
ability of investment.21 8 Aggregate capital investment is thereby lower for
the economy, resulting in a consequent reduction in income, employment,
and overall social welfare.219
Although the illegal nature of insider trading is settled, the question of
who can enforce it against whom still has many fuzzy answers.220 The Pri-
210. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813,819(2002).
211. U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 646 (1997).
212. Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28
CARDOzo L. REv. 333, 336 n.10 (2006).
213. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, 80 Am. ECON.
REv. 1022, 1037 (1990).
214. Presumably, if the economic arguments were simple, Henry Manne-who embraces the use
of economics-would not have continued to maintain his more than forty years of opposition to pro-
hibitions on insider trading, notwithstanding the worldwide rejection of his views. See Henry G.
Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. CoRP. L.
167, 168 n.5 (2005) ("I do not consider the SEC's 'official' line on insider trading, that it destroys
the confidence of investors and thus lessens both liquidity and investment, to have serious merit.
Apart from being a nearly unfalsifiable proposition, it is devoid of the scantest economic or empiri-
cal content. It has, however, been enormously important in the propaganda campaign the SEC has
waged for years to demonize insider trading."). It appears as if Dean Manne has not yet read Profes-
sor Ausubel's work.
215. See Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 42, at 305 ("[Insider trading] can only proper-
ly be analyzed in a general equilibrium model.").
216. Id at 307.
217. Id at 335.
218. Id.
219. Id
220. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of Rule JOB-5for Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L. REv. 380, 407 (2006) (stating that
there are significant unanswered questions about important interpretive issues under Rule 1Ob-5);
Jacob M. Kantrow, Note, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: Not Really a Loss Causation Case,
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vate Securities Litigation Act erected some procedural barriers against pri-
vate plaintiffs, and rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court have also raised ob-
stacles. 221 Also, it is virtually impossible to bring a class action without rely-
ing on the fraud-on-the-market hypothesis, which in turn relies on the
validity of the efficient market hypothesis.222 Private plaintiffs must estab-
lish reliance on false or misleading statements. 223 This is typically done in-
directly by arguing first, that the market is efficient meaning that the market
price impounds all publicly available information; and second, that false and
misleading statements were in the marketplace.224 Arguing that the market
is inefficient breaks the causal chain that is required to maintain a cause of
action.225 The behavioral assault on neoclassical economics, specifically on
the assumption that individuals can coherently express their own preferences
through their choices, is an immediate threat to the paradigm of investor so-
226
vereignty.
67 LA. L. REv. 257, 274 (2006) (stating that there is an important unanswered question about the
survival of private actions for price manipulation after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
221. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and
Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintifs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 3-
41 (1996) (describing the procedural hurdles created by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995). See also Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes ofAction, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-13, 32-35 (1998) (describing the diffi-
culties that plaintiffs in securities cases face after enactment of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 and Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998).
222. See Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litiga-
tion, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (2006) ("In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the United States Supreme
Court made it easier for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5 to prove the essen-
tial element of reliance. The Court held that under the so-called fraud-on-the-market theory, a plain-
tiff who purchased securities on an 'open and developed' market can be presumed to have relied on
the integrity of the market price and in that way to have relied, indirectly, on allegedly false or mis-
leading public statements of the defendants.") (footnotes omitted).
223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); Rule 1Ob-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2000).
224. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988) ("We need not determine by adju-
dication what economists and social scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statis-
tical analysis and the application of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the presumption of
reliance in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.").
225. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD.
L. REV. 348, 358-59 (2007) (explaining that the efficient market theory provides the basis for re-
liance and causation).
226. Klock, Dead Hands, supra note 23, at 159-60 (suggesting that paternalistic protection
against irrational behavior interferes with personal freedom to make investment decisions).
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Indeed, Stephen Choi has argued that protecting investor confidence
should not be the goal of the SEC in the presence of investor irrationality. 227
He has further argued that regulatory responses could benefit irrational in-
vestors.2 28 This argument implicitly assumes that there is some social bene-
fit in protecting irrational investors. The term irrational is loosely defined
for this section. I am not challenging our longstanding tradition of protect-
ing children and other mentally incapacitated members of society. The term
irrational, as used by Choi and others, does not refer to people who have in-
transitive preferences. Instead, it refers to people who systematically make
bad decisions.229  At some point we have to honestly consider whether
people who are merely lazy and careless are worthy of being protected from
their laziness and carelessness.230 Yes, lazy and careless people deserve pro-
tection from fraud, but not from their own carelessness.231 If someone has
revealed that his well-being matters so little to him that he will not provide
even himself with an ordinary duty of care, it is unreasonable to divert
scarce resources to protecting these low-value assets.232 If there is such a
compelling reason to use our federal securities laws and policies to provide
protection to people who make bad decisions, why do we not have federal
legislation mandating motorcycle helmets on interstate highways? 233
Our philosophy of letting people make their own choices, absent fraud
and without judging those choices, has served our financial markets and
economic prosperity well.234 This philosophy not only promotes confidence
in the market, but it also promotes responsibility for choices. 235 An analogy
227. See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 85, 85 (2006) (questioning whether the SEC goal of protecting investor
confidence is justified).
228. See id. at 128 ("Not all investors are rational and some of the less rational investors may suf-
fer from participating in the markets.").
229. See Ribstein, Noisy Market, supra note 9, at 139-40 (discussing investor irrationality in
terms of investor "mistakes" and "judgment errors").
230. Klock, Dead Hands, supra note 23, at 133 ("Protecting individuals from bad decisions has
detrimental effects. It reduces their incentive to make good decisions ... [and] lowers the payoff
associated with educating and informing oneself and researching and analyzing potential invest-
ments. . . .").
231. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 76-80 (making a case for protecting individuals
against fraud but not providing protection against poor decisions).
232. See Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 6 (2003) [hereinafter Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics] ("Markets deal harshly with
fools; our cynical side worries that government affords a safe haven.").
233. I believe that most of us consider driving a motorcycle at a high rate of speed without a hel-
met to be unreasonably dangerous. But because the behavioralists assert that we are all irrational,
perhaps we are wrong about the unreasonableness of this activity.
234. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 109 ("We should ... return to the regime [of
providing aiding and abetting liability for less than full disclosure] that served our markets so
well .... ).
235. Id. at 79.
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is provided by simple issues concerning traffic safety. As young children,
we learn to look both ways before crossing the street, and to cross at desig-
nated places.236 If someone were to place so little value on their own per-
sonal safety that they would walk into traffic without looking, should we
protect them by painting more crosswalks? 237 If so, where is the line drawn?
Should all boulevards be designated one hundred percent crosswalks? It
should be obvious that there are costs associated with such "remedies" for
the problem of individual carelessness. In 2001, I wrote:
[N]egligent investors deserve no protection, and such protection
creates a moral hazard problem. The level of rational ignorance is
increased as inattentive investors can attempt to renegotiate bad
outcomes in court after the fact. Investors can make uninformed
decisions, or make excessively risky gambles, in the belief that they
may seek protection after the fact in the event of a bad payoff.
Suppose, hypothetically, that government could protect individu-
als from making bad decisions... . If we assume that the govern-
ment has an opportunity to reverse one bad decision made at one
time by one individual and thereby make that individual better off at
that point without changing anything else, then we may reach one
conclusion. But if we recognize that by protecting individuals from
bad investment decisions we influence future behavior, we may
reach a different conclusion.238
Professor Hoffman suggests that my approach is tantamount to imposing
a duty on shareholders to be rational. 239 This is an overstatement. Share-
holders do not owe a duty to behave rationally; they simply must live with
the consequences of imprudence.240
236. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, KidsWalk-to-School: Pedestrian Safety,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/kidswalk/pedestrian.safety.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (em-
phasizing the importance of teaching children pedestrian safety).
237. But see GLORIA OHLAND, TRINH NGUYEN & JAMES CORLESS, DANGEROUS BY DESIGN:
PEDESTRIAN SAFETY IN CALIFORNIA, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY PROJECT 21-22 (Sept.
2000), http://www.transact.org/ca/design/Dangerous%20by%20Design.pdf (discussing California's
policy of removing pedestrian crosswalks so that pedestrians will not have a "false sense of securi-
ty").
238. Klock, Dead Hands, supra note 23, at 132-33 (footnotes omitted).
239. Hoffman, supra note 117, at 538 ("In reality, courts hold purchasers of securities to some-
thing similar to a duty of care. Courts require investors to ... be economically rational.") (footnote
omitted).
240. See Klock, Dead Hands, supra note 23, at 144 ("Shareholders should not be treated as child-
ren who have given their money to their parents. Shareholders are in a cooperative arrangement
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Behavioralists hold the mistaken belief that irrational behavior is the re-
sult of incompetence to behave rationally, whereas trained researchers in
psychology actually understand that people are capable of choosing to make
rational decisions in appropriate situations with appropriate incentives. 24 1 In
the words of Professor Mitchell:
Legal scholars increasingly rely on a behavioral analysis of judg-
ment and decision making to explain legal phenomena and argue for
legal reforms. The main argument of this new behavioral analysis
of the law is twofold: (1) All human cognition is beset by systemat-
ic flaws . .. that ... lead to predictable irrational behaviors and (2)
these widespread and systematic nonrational tendencies bring into
serious question the assumption of procedural rationality underlying
much legal doctrine.... Careful scrutiny of the psychological re-
search reveals greater adherence to norms of rationality than that
implied by the legal behavioralists, and the methodological and in-
terpretive limitations on this psychological research make extrapola-
tion from experimental settings to real world legal settings often in-
appropriate.... [L]egal scholars should exercise greater care and
precision in their uses of psychological data to avoid advocating
further legal reforms based on flawed understandings of psycholog-
ical research.242
Opponents to the idea of accepting market outcomes as efficient consis-
tently fail to address an important void in the behavioral movement.243 If the
market process is not going to be used to allocate resources because it is in-
efficient, what efficient process for allocating resources is to replace it? Ar-
guing that markets are inefficient and not to be trusted is not constructive un-
less the advocate of market inefficiency has an alternative proposal for
with the directors and, in addition to voting, can review vast amounts of mandatory disclosure ma-
terial. If they choose not to do so, that is their decision.").
241. See Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 77. Professor Mitchell, who is a law pro-
fessor with a Ph.D. in Psychology, provides the following passage which summarizes the relevant,
peer-reviewed research:
[There is] a growing body of empirical research demonstrating that individuals vary
widely, and predictably, in their propensities to act rationally. In other words, this re-
search tells us that cognitive biases do not affect us all with uncanny consisten-
cy.... [D]epending on the characteristics of the individual and the system of thought ac-
tivated in a particular decisionmaking situation, the behavior of different groups of
individuals and the behavior of the same individual over time may vary considerably,
from perfect rationality to seeming irrationality.
Id. at 86-87 (footnote omitted).
242. Mitchell, Unwarranted Pessimism, supra note 142, at 1907.
243. See Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note 90, at 77 ("An empirical critique can only go as
far as its data goes.").
188
[Vol. 37: 153, 2010] Economic Science v. Pseudo-Economic Nonsense
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
improving upon the process. 244 If market outcomes cannot be accepted be-
cause the market is not efficient, then implicitly there must be an alternative
process that is an improvement. I submit that the only possible alternative is
a political process, and that nothing could be more inefficient than political
decisionmaking.24 5 Just imagine allowing courts, legislative commissions,
and executive agencies to determine the suitability of investments, set prices,
and regulate returns on pharmaceutical corporations! The Soviet Union tried
this approach and failed miserably.
I am not arguing that markets are perfect. There are many well-known
instances of market failure that call for market intervention.246 But these sit-
uations call for intervening in a manner that allows the market to function
better.247 The harm caused by a monopoly can be eliminated by breaking up
244. Id. ("[The behavioral law and economics movement] presently offers little helpful
guidance about how to amend prevailing assumptions. So long as the behavioral analysts of
law engage in the same sort of empirically suspect armchair analysis, unfalsifiable theorizing,
and overgeneralization that they criticize economic analysts of law for engaging in, behavioral
law and economics should be considered nothing more than an equally theoretical but more
pessimistic version of law and economics.").
245. Professor Kenneth J. Arrow received a Nobel Prize in 1972 for formally proving that it is
impossible to construct a collective social voting mechanism that simultaneously satisfies minimal
conditions for justice (e.g., one person, one vote) and provides a rational ordering of social choices
(e.g., if A is preferred to B and B to C, then C is not preferred to A). See Kathy Sawyer, A Paradox
of Majority Politics, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at A3. It is now well-known that rational individual
preferences cannot be aggregated to achieve a rational social preference ordering without imposing
socially unacceptable constraints such as dictatorship. See, e.g., IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE 25
(1987) ("[T]here are deep problems with all procedures of getting from many preferences to one
decision."). There is vast literature spanning many disciplines (including ethics, philosophy, eco-
nomics, sociology, psychology, and political science) on the fundamental incompatibility between
voter sovereignty and rational collective choice. For an accessible description of this incompatibili-
ty, see ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE: A CASE
STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 1-12 (1980). This multidisciplinary literature is highly
cited within the legal literature. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability-Ironies in the
Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 975-81 (1998); Saul Levmore, Parlia-
mentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REv. 971, 985 (1989)
("The paradox is surely one of the best known insights or topics in the social sciences.").
246. See Klock, Unconscionability, supra note 25, at 354 ("There are situations in which markets
fail to function well.").
247. See id. at 356-57. Consider the following:
Regulations that are designed to restore the proper functioning of a market that has been
impaired by a specifically identified problem are more effective. Two examples of more
successful regulations relating to markets are the securities laws and antitrust laws. For
instance, fraud and deception can destroy markets, but the federal securities laws are de-
signed to keep fraud out of and protect the integrity of the market, without stepping into
the paternalistic area of deciding what is suitable for investors. Similarly, collusion in
markets can lower output and raise prices, but the antitrust laws are designed to deter
these effects without deciding how much should be produced and what prices should be
charged.
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the monopolist into competitors.248 The lemons problem caused by asymme-
tric information can be mitigated with adequate penalties for fraud and man-
datory disclosure requirements. 249 However, those behavioral commentators
who argue that individuals are not rational decision makers do not have a
corresponding fix for the market.250 Rather, they are implicitly arguing to
replace market functions with an alternative.
If courts cannot accept the valuation of the financial market as the best
estimate available, then they can replace that valuation with a formula writ-
ten by a legislature or commission or an opinion formed by an elected or po-
litically appointed judge. 251' How could this possibly improve the accuracy
of the valuation? 252 No matter how wrong the valuations of the financial
market are, they are the best available and should be embraced as democracy
is embraced for being the best available political system notwithstanding its
many inherent flaws. We decide issues politically when decisiveness is
more important than accuracy:
Public choice theory suggests that institutions develop for reasons.
The motivation behind the plurality rules method of voting is not
promotion of society's preferred choices. This follows from the fact
that no voting system produces a consistent set of choices. Indeed,
the most reasonable argument which has ever been made in defense
of our voting system is that it is no worse than any alternatives.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Indeed, they cannot have a fix because they do not have a model ofbehavior-they are anti-
theoretical and unscientific. See Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 5, at 1552. As Judge Posner
writes:
JST don't actually tell us what "behavioral economics" means. But implicitly they define
it negatively: It is economics minus the assumption that people are rational maximizers of
their satisfactions. Its relation to standard economics is thus a bit like the relation of
non-Euclidean to Euclidean geometry, though with the important difference that
non-Euclidean geometry is as theoretically rigorous as Euclidean geometry, whereas be-
havioral economics is, as we shall see, antitheoretical.
Id.
251. Cf Old Colony Bondholders v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 161 F.2d 413, 450 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Frank, J., dissenting in part) ("If... the Commission is sustained in this case, and, accordingly, be-
haves similarly in future cases, then its conduct will indeed be a mystery. Its so-called "valuations"
will then be acceptable, no matter how contrived. In that event, it would be desirable to abandon the
word "valuation"-since that word misleadingly connotes some moderately rational judgment-and
to substitute some neutral term, devoid of misleading associations, such as "[v]aluation," [sic] or,
perhaps better still, "woosh-woosh.". . . Then no one would be foolish enough to believe that the
figures in a Commission plan necessarily have anything to do with deliberation, but everyone would
know that the figures [and conclusions] might well have been the product of... mystagogues.")
(footnotes omitted).
252. Cf Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics, supra note 232, at 5 ("[l]f everyone suffers
from cognitive defects, doesn't that also include the commissioners and staff of the SEC?").
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Given that our system of voting (or any system of voting) does not
exist to promote the best social choices, we must look elsewhere for
its motivating factors. We vote because it is an acceptable method
for making a decision about who will govern, and then we move on.
We recognize that there is no socially acceptable method of making
the best decisions. Therefore, rather than seeking efficiency in the
decisions, we, as a society, seek efficiency in the process. There is
value in quickly settling disputes, making decisions, and moving
on.253
B. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Hovenkamp's Critique
There is a large body of literature documenting the inherent instability
of political decision making.254 Economists refer to this field as public
choice. 255 Public choice economists have demonstrated numerous problems
with collective decision-making.256 To a social reformer, the most feared
tool of the public choice economist is Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theo-
rem.257 Professor Arrow, who received a Nobel Prize for his work, formally
proved that a democratic system in which voters have equally weighted
votes and independent preferences cannot produce a rational preference or-
dering. 25 8 Although Arrow's work involves complex math, the conclusion
253. Klock, Will ofthe People, supra note 85, at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
254. See sources cited supra note 245.
255. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989) ("Public choice can be defined as the eco-
nomic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political
science.").
256. It is well-known that rational individual preferences cannot be aggregated to achieve a ra-
tional social preference ordering without imposing socially unacceptable constraints such as dicta-
torship. See, e.g., MCLEAN, supra note 245, at 25 ("[T]here are deep problems with all procedures
of getting from many preferences to one decision."). A commonly-given example of this is the fact
that there is nothing inconsistent with a majority preferring A to B, another majority preferring B to
C, and another preferring C to A. See, e.g., id. at 25-27. This implies that there is no such thing as a
"best policy" for the government because there is no platform that another platform cannot beat. See
id. at 103. Mechanisms like plurality voting, or institutional devices such as the electoral college,
can serve to break this cycle and reach a decision, albeit an unstable one, because efficiency de-
mands that a decision be made rather than endure an infinite filibuster.
257. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75
IOWA L. REv. 949, 949 (1990) ("Arrow's theorem is perhaps the most fearsome tool the public
choice theorist owns. True believers can use it to prove, at least to their own satisfaction, that legis-
lative bodies (or groups of voters in general) almost never produce policies that represent the public
choice in any meaningful way.").
258. Professor Arrow's work suggests that the means cannot be justified by the goal of reaching
society's preferred decision because such a concept cannot exist. Professor Arrow gives the follow-
ing interpretation of his theorem:
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can be summarized succinctly and is highly intuitive-when more than two
choices exist, election markets are highly unstable.259
A simple example involving three voters can be used to illustrate the
problem.2 6 Suppose that one person prefers X to Y and Y to Z, another pre-
fers X to Z and Z to Y, and the third prefers Y to Z and Z to X. In this sce-
nario, two thirds of the voters will prefer X over Y, two thirds will prefer Y
over Z, and two thirds will prefer Z over X. Any election outcome will de-
pend on the sequence of voting and will be unstable in the sense that an al-
ternative outcome will be preferred by a majority of the voters.26' Interes-
tingly, this problem was recognized long ago by an Oxford University
faculty member who observed how difficult it was for the faculty body to
make internally consistent decisions and how much time was spent fighting
over procedure rather than substance.262
Some have attempted to argue that Arrow's Theorem overstates the irra-
tionality of political decisions.263 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has argued
that intransitivity and instability are overstated because Arrow's proof as-
sumes independence of preferences.264 Hovenkamp contends that people
will cooperate and allow the strong preferences of others to outweigh their
own weak preferences. 265 There are two weaknesses in Professor Hoven-
kamp's analysis, however. The first is that it allows for cooperation without
allowing for vindictiveness. If coalitions of voters are vindictive, then lo-
grolling is even more likely. The second is that Hovenkamp does not allow
for lexicographical preferences. A lexicographical preference is one in
which more (or less) of one thing dominates all other bundles regardless of
If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility [weighing some votes
more than others], then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social prefe-
rences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of in-
dividual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial.
KENNETH J. ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59 (2d ed. 1963).
259. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE
5-6 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). Professor Mueller states:
But the conditions under which majority rule produces an equilibrium with three or more
possible outcomes, or the restriction that there be only two possible outcomes, seem so
restrictive that many public choice scholars have not concluded that all problems of pre-
ference aggregation can be solved by relying on the simple majority rule to make collec-
tive decisions. For all its attractive properties, the majority rule does not throw off the
shadow cast by Arrow's theorem.
Id.
260. Klock, Will ofthe People, supra note 85, at 15.
261. Id.
262. Id. This was an independent discovery. The earliest credit is given to Jean-Charles de Borda
in 1781. Id. at 14 n.77.
263. See Hovenkamp, supra note 257, at 949-50 (arguing that legislative voting mechanisms
work better than "Arrow's theorem would admit").
264. Id. at 952.
265. Id.
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what else is contained.266 In other words, the individual is not willing to
make any trade or compromise.26 7 Given that many political issues are high-
ly emotional and contentious, where individuals on both sides are unwilling
to consider compromise, logrolling is much more likely than what Professor
Hovenkamp suggests. Highly charged issues such as abortion, capital pu-
nishment, creationism in the classroom, homosexual marriage, and animal
rights serve as emotional battlefields where people hold strong and uncom-
promising beliefs, and thus are willing to vote against other groups' issues in
retaliation for those groups' lack of support for their own.268
I conclude this section with the simple observation that the "calculus of
consent does not obey the laws of algebra."26 9 Although in society's collec-
tive judgment A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, A is not necessari-
ly preferred to C.270 Not only do free markets perform remarkably well,
their alternatives perform remarkably miserably.271 As I have previously
noted:
What the public choice literature teaches us is the following. There
is no constitutional system for collectively determining social prefe-
rences that results in efficient and rational decisions and provides
political equality and decisiveness. It might be that we do not im-
pose any significant voter qualification requirements such as com-
petence because our real interest lies solely in the act of making de-
cisions, not in the decisions themselves. Making decisions that
enable government to get on to the business of governing is the only
possible purpose elections can serve.272
266. A dictionary orders words lexicographically. Words that begin with the letter "a" come be-
fore words that begin with the letter "b" without regard to what follows. See WEBSTER'S II, supra
note 109, at 689.
267. See id.
268. See David Nakamura, Resignation's Reverberations; Thornton's Move Creates Local, State
Intrigue, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1999, at M07 (suggesting that, in certain instances, local politicians
hold grudges and retaliate on other issues when given the chance).
269. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 79.
270. Indeed, the concept of a socially preferred ordering does not exist. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that Arrow's theorem suggests that
there is no hope of meaningfully constructing majority will).
271. See Tollison, supra note 6, at 340 ("To the extent that one can draw a positive principle from
Arrow, it is that democracy should yield capricious and unstable outcomes.").
272. Klock, Will ofthe People, supra note 85, at 49 (footnote omitted).
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V. THE ARTISTIC USE OF REASONABLE ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIC
SCIENCE
A. Social Sciences, Scientific Methodology, and Art
It is obvious that economics is a social science because the subject of
economics is the study of human behavior.27 Economics is about how
people choose between alternatives and how changing the alternatives (in-
centives) will affect their choices.274 Whether or not economics can claim to
be a science was once debated.275 The issue was arguably resolved when the
Nobel committee established the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in
1968.276 The economist's claim to being a scientist comes from the discip-
line's commitment to a methodology which is scientific. 27
Science attempts to avoid normative judgments.278 Science creates re-
futable propositions based on theories and then uses data to refute or support
the theory. 279 A theory, supported or disproven by facts, is an attempt to ex-
plain observable phenomena.280 An example of a theory is the economist's
law of demand, which in essence is an explanation about how people will
behave in the face of changing prices.281 The explanation given is that when
the price of an item increases, meaning that people must sacrifice more of
other commodities in exchange for the item sought, people will consume
less of that item due to the higher price. As this theory follows the scientific
approach, it could potentially be refuted by observed data. Now contrast this
economic theory with the assertion that everyone should have free health-
273. See COPELAND ET AL., supra note 39, at 45 ("Economics is the study of how people and so-
cieties choose to allocate scarce resources and distribute wealth among one another and over time.").
274. Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 188.
275. Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific
Method in the Study ofLaw, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 875, 880 n.16 ("There is, of course, a great deal of
controversy about whether economics is really a 'science' . . . .").
276. Cf DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMics 56 (1994)
("The question [whether economics is a Science] should be retired. It was meaningful only in a brief
period in the middle of the twentieth century, and now it merely serves to show that the person ask-
ing it has not read anything in science studies since 1955 and does not believe that biology, evolu-
tion, and geology are sciences.").
277. See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnsen, Daubert, The Scientific Method, and Economic Expert Testimo-
ny, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 151 (1999) ("I'll argue that economics follows the scientific me-
thod in the same style as physics. Economics is an empirical method of solving disputes.").
278. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 69, at 3-7.
279. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 836-37
(1988) (discussing the scientific process).
280. SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 7.
281. See STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 91 (using the law of supply and demand to explain how pric-
es are determined in competitive markets).
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care, which is a normative judgment that cannot be refuted by observed data
and is not capable of being tested through scientific analysis.
Professor Eugene Silberberg provides a succinct explanation of the role
of theory in science:
It is always possible that a new theory will be developed which will
explain a given set of events. Hence, theories are in principle, as a
matter of logic, unprovable. They can only be confirmed, i.e.,
found to be consistent with the facts. The more times a theory is
confirmed, the more strongly we shall believe in its postulates, but
we can never be sure that it is true.
What types of theories are useful in empirical science, then? The
only theories that are useful are those which might be wrong, i.e.,
might be refuted, but are not refuted. A theory which says that it
will either rain or not rain tomorrow is no theory at all. It is incapa-
ble of being falsified, since the predicted "event" is logically true.
A theory which says that if the price of gasoline rises, consumption
will either rise or fall is similarly useless and uninteresting, for the
same reason. The only theories which are useful are those from
which refutable hypotheses can be inferred.282
It is often noted that economists are frequently wrong when forecasting
the future, whereas physicists and chemists can make much more precise
calculations about the phenomena they study.283 This criticism reflects a
common misconception about the accuracy of other sciences.28 For exam-
ple, engineers use precise equations to calculate the strength of materials for
their structures, and yet, even after they incorporate safety factors of fifty
percent or more into their calculations, those structures still collapse on oc-
casion. 285 Anyone who follows weather forecasts knows that predicting the
future is inherently difficult.286 Indeed, the inaccuracy of economists' fore-
casts does not render their methods unscientific.
282. SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 10 (footnote omitted).
283. But see Johnsen, supra note 277, at 151 (stating that an economist's prediction about what
will happen to a fifty dollar bill on a table (it will disappear) is more accurate than a physicist's pre-
diction (it will remain at rest)).
284. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 56, at 5.
285. Id.
286. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 1, at 77 ("First, financial decisions are decisions
about the future, and it is impossible to assess in the present whether a decision about the future is
accurate. We cannot verify tomorrow's weather forecast today.") (footnote omitted); Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer's Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21
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In contrast with science, art involves an appeal to aesthetic tastes.287
Artists tend to develop a unique style, largely resulting from their choice of
subject matter, composition, and medium. Still life with oil and canvas
might work well for some artists and their subjects but poorly for others.
Similarly, the artistic element of economics is in choosing assumptions that
make for an aesthetically pleasing trade-off between reality and abstrac-
tion.288 The goal is to abstract the salient features of reality without becom-
ing mired in minutiae.289 Again, recall the analogy of a roadmap; replication
of every detail might make the map more realistic, but such detail also rend-
ers the map less useful. Arguably, a map that preserves only the salient fea-
tures of the roads, while omitting minutiae, is easier to navigate.290
Science and art are not mutually exclusive methods of communication;
it is possible to blend the two together. Where science emphasizes a metho-
dology of comparing data with theories, art emphasizes an appeal to aesthet-
ics. This can readily be seen when one contemplates the teaching of science.
Science is science, but teaching is an ar291 Science can either be taught
sloppily and in an unpleasant manner, or it can be taught neatly with a plea-
sant demeanor. Just as teachers apply different, creative approaches to the
J. CORP. L. 457, 462 (1996) (stating that "valuation is an inexact science").
287. One definition of art is: "Conscious arrangement or production of sounds, colors, forms,
movements, or other elements in a way that affects the aesthetic sense .... " WEBSTER'S II, supra
note 109, at 127. One definition of aesthetic is: "Of or relating to the sense of the beautiful." Id. at
82. The old adage "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder," underscores the personal and subjective
nature of art.
288. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 112, at 397 ("The art of modeling or analysis is to know which
abstractions one can make and still capture the essential elements of the problem, or in other words,
which simplifying assumptions can be made and still preserve the essence of the problem for the
purpose of the analysis.").
289. See id ("Every model or analysis of a problem is necessarily an abstraction from reality, ig-
noring some complication of life to focus on others."); see also JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD
E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 2 (2d ed. 1971) ("The more general theories are fruitful be-
cause they contain statements which abstract from particulars and find elements which many situa-
tions have in common. Increased understanding is realized at the cost of the sacrificed detail.").
290. Consider the following excerpt from a popular text:
Because all models simplify reality by stripping part of it away, they are abstractions.
Critics of economics often point to abstraction as a weakness. Most economists, howev-
er, see abstraction as a real strength.
Like maps, economic models are abstractions that strip away detail to expose only
those aspects of behavior that are important to the question being asked....
But be careful. Although abstraction is a powerful tool for exposing and analyzing spe-
cific aspects of behavior, it is possible to oversimplify....
The key here is that the appropriate amount of simplification and abstraction depends
upon the use to which the model will be put. To return to the map example: You don't
want to walk around San Francisco with a map made for drivers-there are too many
very steep hills!
CASE& FAIR, supra note 107, at 10-11.
291. JOSEPH AXELROD, THE UNIVERSITY TEACHER As ARTIST 9-10 (1973).
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teaching of science, so it is with economists and their economic models.
Making assumptions is an economist's artistic choice that can either enhance
an understanding of the salient features of economic decision-making or dis-
tort reality to the point that the conclusions bear no resemblance to what ac-
tually happens in our universe.292 Assuming the scales of justice must be
supported by the ground does not help us to understand what happens in a
courtroom any more than assuming that market participants have exogenous
beliefs about the future and unlimited wealth helps us to understand what
happens in a market.
B. Assumptions, Models, and New Research on Old Finance
Assumptions play an important role in all models whether the models
are legal, economic, or other types.293 For example, the abstract legal con-
struct of the scales of justice implicitly assumes that evidence can be
weighed and that a reasonable person can make a determination as to where
the preponderance lies, or whether the standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence or beyond reasonable doubt has been met.294 However, the quality of
a model is not evaluated by the accuracy of the assumptions but by the accu-
291
racy of the predictions. Commentators who assert that a model is wrong
merely because the assumptions are wrong misunderstand the role of as-
sumptions.296 Good assumptions simplify the analysis while yielding accu-
rate predictions, and either draw attention to what is important or what is un-
important.297 Poor assumptions provide misleading predictions or mask
292. See SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 7 (explaining that assumptions are the link between
theory and real objects, and as such they must be observable and realistic in order to create valid
theoretical tests).
293. See id. at II ("A model becomes a theory when assumptions relating the theoretical con-
structs to real objects are added.").
294. See generally Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 188-94 (discussing nonexistent things
with useful applications in reality, such as Euclidean lines, imaginary numbers, and the scales of
justice).
295. See SHEFFRIN, supra note 68, at 34-35 (explaining that theoretical constructs are not real
facts nor phenomena to be explained, just incorrect simplifications made to facilitate analysis).
296. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 69, at 14 ("To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be de-
scriptively false in its assumptions . . . .").
297. As an example, consider the following comment on a famous, unrealistic model:
Proposition I, holding the value of a firm to be independent of its capital structure (that is,
its debt/equity ratio) is accepted as an implication of equilibrium in perfect capital mar-
kets.
... Less clear, however, is the empirical significance of the MM value-invariance
Proposition I in its original sphere of corporation finance.
... [T]he view that capital structure is literally irrelevant or that "nothing matters" in
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what is important.2 9 8 The art of good model-building lies in the ability to as-
sume well.299
Some commentators criticize economic models containing predictions
they do not like by criticizing the basic assumptions in an unconstructive
manner.300 Other commentators accept economic models with predictions
they do like without contemplating the sensibility of the underlying assump-
tions.30' I suggest that the most useful approach is to seriously evaluate how
the underlying economic assumptions matter.302 Constructive criticism of
the assumptions will advance an argument more persuasively than either
blind reliance or ad hominem attacks.303
The primary model that motivated this paper claimed that equilibrium is
not possible in the simultaneous presence of investor disagreement and per-
304fect markets. That model explicitly assumed that the investors had no
wealth constraints.305 Countless other commentators have claimed that mar-
kets consistently and persistently misprice information substantially and
have invoked economic models with equally unreasonable assumptions.306
corporate finance, though still sometimes attributed to us ... is far from what we ever ac-
tually said about the real-world applications of our theoretical propositions. Looking
back now, perhaps we should have put more emphasis on the other, upbeat side of the
"nothing matters" coin: showing what doesn't matter can also show, by implication, what
does.
Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 99-
100 (1988).
298. See SHEFFRIN, supra note 68, at 34 (discussing how assumptions are always simplifying and
therefore incorrect, but must be close enough to essential elements of reality to provide good predic-
tions).
299. See Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 193 ("Selecting the trade-offs to be made is the art
of model building .... .").
300. See, e.g., David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Contract and the Limits of Eco-
nomics': Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets, in CONTRACTS, CO-OPERATION, AND
COMPETITION 307, 307-08 (Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie eds., 1997) ("The characteristic soci-
ological shortcoming of neoclassical economics is that its methodological commitment to assump-
tions of individual utility maximization has overall prevented it from developing a plausible philo-
sophic anthropology of the economic agent, and, consequently, from appreciating the social
constitution of economic action."); id. at 308, 326 (calling economic analysis of law repugnant and
policy prescriptions morally disgusting).
301. For example, Henry Manne likes the assumption that outside investors will not adjust their
supply of capital in response to a lower price for capital. See Manne, supra note 214, at 168 n.5.
302. Another manner of putting this is to suggest that consumers of economic models should ask
questions about whether removing an assumption will change a conclusion or whether removing an
assumption will obfuscate an understanding of the mechanism that makes the model work.
303. See Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 42, at 319 ("[Mlost commentators who disag-
ree ... have reacted by lashing out at the entire economics profession or ignoring the economic ar-
guments altogether. A better response would be to examine [the] underlying assumptions and rea-
soning and to criticize the economics of [the] arguments.").
304. Stout, New Finance, supra note 15, at 97.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Dunbar & Heller, supra note 118, at 531 ("Since the initial acceptance, criticism of
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Professors Loewenstein and Willard explain that basic principles of
economics, such as limited liability, collateralized credit, and market clear-
ing, restrict the properties of asset prices regardless of investors' behavior.307
Limits on the properties of asset prices are demonstrated in a model using
only market clearing and budget equations with virtually no assumptions re-
garding investors' behavior.30 s In the words of Loewenstein and Willard:
The economic intuition of our results is longstanding, clear, and
compatible with more general neoclassical models of full rationality
that are built on the same behavior-independent principles that we
study. Simply put, investor behavior can be important for equili-
brium asset prices, but only within certain limits that apply univer-
sally to all assumptions about investor behavior.309
In other words, in the presence of budget constraints and market clear-
ing, there are limits on the properties of asset prices that hold under either
the assumption of rational investors or the assumption of irrational inves-
tors.3t o Professors Loewenstein and Willard demonstrate that researchers
who have introduced models with noise traders and demonstrated the possi-
bility of large and persistent deviations of asset prices from fundamental
value also introduced other implicit assumptions, such as unlimited riskless
the efficient market hypothesis has only grown larger. What began as a study of a few anomalies or
instances where the theory did not perform well has grown to a well-developed alternative school of
thought that has both theoretical underpinnings and empirical research in its support."); Jill E. Fisch,
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 672
(2006) ("[S]tock price is a poor measure of firm value. Even in a market that is relatively informa-
tionally efficient, it is unlikely that market prices reflect fundamental value."); Erik F. Gerding, The
Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CoNN. L. REv. 393,
400 (2006) ("[B]ehavioral finance draws upon extensive research in behavioral psychology and eco-
nomics to demonstrate that investors do not act with perfect rationality. Moreover, behavioral
finance has documented both statistical evidence of mispricings in securities .... ); Ronald J. Gil-
son & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight
Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 717 (2003) (claiming that behavioral finance has displaced market efficien-
cy); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securi-
ties Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 483 (2003) ("Extensive studies show sustained mispricings
and inefficiencies in capital markets .... .").
307. Loewenstein & Willard, supra note 16, at 232.
308. Id. at 256.
309. Id. at 257.
310. Id at 232.
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credit.31' They further show that the implicit assumptions-not investor irra-
tionality-drive the mispricing result.312
Loewenstein and Willard's important research is motivated by models
that contain implicit assumptions taking them out of the realm of reality.3 13
Perhaps the most salient feature of a credit economy is limited liability.3 14
Given the finite term of human life, it is impossible to conceive of a world
without limited liability. The necessary existence of limited liability urges
limits on credit. In reality, individuals cannot choose portfolios that are not
feasible and cannot borrow unlimited amounts without collateral.3 " These
assumptions are critically important." Loewenstein and Willard write:
We argue that many properties of asset prices can be derived with-
out reference to specific assumptions about investor rationality, giv-
en minimal and natural assumptions about limited asset liability,
market clearing, and limited storage withdrawals. Our paper does
not provide a defense for either investor rationality or nonrationali-
ty.... [I]f one believes that limited asset liability, market clearing,
and limited storage withdrawals are reasonable economic assump-
tions, then one must regard the implied properties of asset prices as
inviolable since they are independent of investor rationality.
The conclusions of this paper are built on the idea that certain
economic principles limit the properties of asset prices independent
of investor behavior, and that the limits implied by limited asset lia-
bility, market clearing, and limited withdrawals from the storage
technology have been inadequately appreciated. Models that de-
viate from these assumptions risk offering misleading economic in-
sights, no matter how tantalizing such insights may seem."
The formal mathematical proofs of their conclusions can be found in their
publication.
311. Id at 231-32.
312. Id at 256.
313. See id at 249 ("We now show that DSSW's explanations of asset pricing puzzles critically
depend on the ability of investors to withdraw unreasonably large amounts of consumption from
storage.").
314. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1985) ("Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate
law .... Limited liability is not unique to corporations. Indeed it is the rule.") (footnote omitted).
315. See STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 35 (explaining the concepts of budget constraints and oppor-
tunity sets).
316. See Loewenstein & Willard, supra note 16, at 249.
317. Id. at 232, 256.
318. Id. at 245-47, 256.
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This relatively recent and careful research received the Smith-Breeden
Prize in 2006."' The prize is given to the most influential new paper pub-
lished in the field of finance. 320  The research painstakingly analyzes the
claims of theoretical model builders who have built models in which prices
can persistently and substantially deviate from their fundamental values and
have claimed that this result is due to the presence of irrational investors.321
For example, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman claimed:
Because the unpredictability of noise traders' future opinions
deters arbitrage, prices can diverge significantly from fundamental
values even when there is no fundamental risk. Noise traders thus
create their own space. All the main results of our paper come from
the observation that arbitrage does not eliminate the effects of noise
because noise itself creates risk.322
What the new research of Professors Loewenstein and Willard has con-
clusively proven is that the result was driven by poor assumptions about li-
mited liability, market clearing, and budget constraints and not the result of
investor irrationality.3 23 Limited liability, market clearing and budget con-
straints necessarily result in prices being anchored to their fundamentals
even when investors are not rational.324
This conclusion contains a lesson for all consumers of economic
theory-conclusions are always driven by the assumptions.325 Professor
Jack Hirshleifer notes: "Scientific analysis involves the construction of theo-
ries or models, which are always, at best, simplified pictures of reality. They
can be regarded as idealizations in which irrelevant or unsystematic pecu-
liarities are stripped away to permit concentration upon the dominant fea-
tures of the situation for the purpose at hand." 326 If the assumptions are rea-
319. Limits ofInvestor Behavior, 8 RESEARCH@SMITH 12 (2007).
320. Richard C. Green, Report of the Editor of The Journal of Finance for the Year 2002, 58 J.
FIN. 1729, 1732 (2003).
321. Loewenstein & Willard, supra note 16, at 256-57.
322. J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, Noise
Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 705 (1990).
323. See Loewenstein & Willard, supra note 16, at 256.
324. See id
325. Cf Klock, Flamboyance, supra note 2, at 252 ("Our goal should be to have informed debates
in which commentators understand the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments in order to make
their case, rather than uninformed debates in which conclusions from experts are cited without an
appreciation for the tenacity of the assumptions underlying them.").
326. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 56, at 55.
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sonable-such as assuming that individuals would prefer more wealth to
less, ceteris paribus-then the conclusions might be reasonable as well.3 27
But if the assumptions are unreasonable-such as the assumption that inves-
tors can borrow without limit-then the conclusions are likely to be mislead-
ing, even though they are correct given the assumptions.328 Certainly it can
be difficult to spot unreasonable implicit assumptions in a highly mathemat-
ical proof. But when a scholar claims that the issuance of Widget shares at
$100, which Bull values at $101 and Bear values at $99, proves that no equi-
librium can exist without wealth constraints, it should be apparent to any
critical thinker that the example is a trivial tautology and proves absolutely
nothing of practical significance to the real world.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pseudo-economic nonsense should not be confused with "voodoo eco-
nomics.,,3 29 The second term involves plausible, albeit unlikely, theories. 330
The first term refers to ideas that are facially invalid.
The most frightening part of this story is not that a highly educated and
respected scholar would use a pseudo-economic model in which all of the
variables are exogenously set to prove a result. The most frightening part of
this story is that multiple editors and readers apparently did not recognize
the absurdity of the claim that no equilibrium can emerge under certain con-
ditions when every variable in the model is given exogenously. The widget
example was published in 2003 in The Journal of Corporation Law and pre-
sumably read, but apparently no one pointed out the problem to the author
because it was used again in 2005 in The Journal of Financial Transforma-
tion and also posted on the internet. Presumably no one would knowingly
want a blunder of this magnitude to circulate so widely. We should also be
careful to recognize that even scholars with advanced formal training in eco-
nomics are prone to develop misleading conclusions when their models in-
corporate implicit assumptions that are not reasonable, such as unlimited
liability and unlimited credit. The prize-winning research of Loewenstein
and Willard proves that the results of models in which financial assets sys-
tematically deviate from their fundamental values are the result of unreason-
able implicit assumptions and not the result of allowing for irrational inves-
327. See SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 7 (explaining why assumptions should be realistic).
328. See id. at 11 (explaining that a model can be logically valid but not conform with real data).
329. Voodoo economics is the term George H. W. Bush coined for the supply-side economics that
Ronald Reagan bought into. Editorial, Referendum on Reaganomics, Supply-side Legacy Hangs
Over the Budget Crisis, SEATELE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1990, at A8.
330. Cf id. (."[V]oodoo economics'[] maintained that lowering taxes on the rich would promote
savings and investment. To be sure, certain parts of the economy were flooded with cash, but even
that limited prosperity was bought with crushing debt.").
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tors.331 When the unreasonable assumptions are removed and we require
binding budget constraints, limited liability, and markets to clear, prices will
remain anchored to their fundamental value regardless of whether investors
are irrational or not.332
This claim does not prove that markets are efficient. Indeed, it is likely
that some markets are not efficient.333 Theories cannot be proven in
science.334 They can only provide refutable propositions that can be tested
with the inherent goal of resulting in either rejection or non-rejection.335
Nevertheless, the logic and intuition of market efficiency is so compelling
that we should require an extremely high threshold of strong and credible
contrary evidence before rejecting the existing evidence that the U.S. market
for liquid and publicly traded equity impounds all publicly available infor-
mation. When individuals claim to have shown that this market is not effi-
cient, the assumptions of the theoretical models and statistical tests ought to
be scrutinized by commentators and policy makers with a great deal more
care than has been used by either the behavioralists or the practitioners of the
'"new finance."
331. Loewenstein & Willard, supra note 16, at 256.
332. Id.
333. Cornell & Rutten, supra note 222, at 448.
334. SILBERBERG, supra note 60, at 10.
335. Id.
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